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By examining the attacks waged against the royal prerogative during
the Exclusion Crisis of 1678-1681, this thesis asserts that the crisis
was primarily constitutional in nature, rather than religious.

This

Parliamentary attempt to remove the Catholic heir presumptive from the
succession endangered the monarchy by creating a Parliamentary title to
the throne.

Insofar as the exclusionists challenged the king's right

to retain ministers at will, to grant pardons, and to determine the
calling and dissolution of Parliamentary sessions, the crisis also
constituted a direct assault upon the prerogatives of the present king.
The implementation of Parliament's proposal to guarantee a Protestant
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succession by arrogating to a Protestant Association many rights of
the monarch would have tipped permanently the scales of power in

favor of Parliament. The Exclusion Crisis can thus be viewed as an
important, albeit abortive, attempt to better define the unresolved
roles of the king and Parliament in the governing of England.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Exclusion Crisis is commonly viewed as a Parliamentary
effort to remove the heir presumptive from the succession on the
grounds of his adherence to the Catholic faith.

Many Englishmen,

both in and out of Parliament, claimed that the exclusion from the
succession of James, Duke of York, was necessary in order to protect
the Church of England from certain ruin at the hands of a Catholic
monarch.

Speeches and pamphlets painted a grim picture of the

horrors which must inevitably accompany the accession of a Catholic
to the throne.

Despite the rabidly anti-Catholic temper of the

years 1678-1681, fed by the "discoveries" of the Popish Plot, one

I

can question whether James's Catholicism was the real issue during

(

the crisis.

I
I

1

This thesis contends that the Exclusion Crisis involved

more than religion; indeed, that political considerations were
primary.
Many people certainly feared that the dogmatic and uncompromising
James would attempt to re-Catholicize England once he came to the
throne.

But in addition to the loss of religion, those who recognized

a link between Catholicism and absolutism expressed fears for the
loss of their liberties as well.

The Earl of Shaftesbury, the

driving force behind the exclusion movement, wrote that the most
important reason for excluding James was that James was the chief
agent of arbitrary government in England.

Clearly, the powers

----- ......... _____ _
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exercised by the king concerned Shaftesbury far more than the loss
of religion.

Since the leading proponent of exclusion considered

the Catholicism of the prospective heir to be less abhorrent than
his tendencies towards absolutism, it is possible to see in the
crisis political considerations operating on par with religious
bigotry.

An examination of the issues raised during the course of

the crisis reveals a thread which runs through much of Stuart
history--the unresolved relationship between the king and Parliament.
The

r~pturous

welcome given Charles II in 1660 had worn thin by

the late 1670s, as Englishmen warily assessed their king's behavior
and intentions.

They saw much to alann them:

the provocative

policies of the Cabal, Danby's attempt to manage Parliament and to
gain financial independence for the Crown, the king's apparent
acquiescence in the face of French aggression on the continent, his
French-Catholic mistress, and his doubtful devotion to the Church of
England.

The fury which accompanied the outbreak of the Popish Plot

in 1678 played into the hands of those who were ready for a
re-assessment of the roles of king and Parliament in the governing
of England.
No clear definition of the king's prerogatives existed during
the Restoration.

In the days before the civil war, Charles I had

consented to several acts limiting the royal prerogative.

These

acts remained in force when his son ascended the throne in 1660.
Charles II could not re-establish the old prerogative courts, nor
could he resort to feudal financial exactions in order to obtain
money.

The restored king retained his control over foreign policy

-
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and the armed forces, the right to detennine the timing of sessions
of Parliament, and the right to decide upon the selection and

retention of Crown ministers.
Like his father, Charles II faced a Parliament determined to
have a voice in foreign affairs, intent on ridding the realm of
unpopular ministers, and leery of the king's religious proclivities.
Throughout his reign Charles II skilfully parried with Parliament,
one time reprimanding members for encroaching upon his prerogatives,
and at another sidestepping a contest by either giving in to their
demands or by exercising his right to prorogue Parliament.

The

relationship between the king and Parliament became increasingly
strained as both parties sought to define their roles to their own
advantage.

Longstanding grievances between the king and Parliament,

left unsettled at the Restoration, would continue to plague England
until their resolution in 1688.

The Exclusion Crisis can be viewed

as a chapter in the ongoing process of defining the balance of power
between king and Parliament.
This thesis maintains that, in resisting the exclusion of his
brother from the succession, Charles II was fighting a larger battle
than has been presumed.

Charles's defense of James's rights was

certainly not based merely upon fraternal affection.

From the

start, Charles realized that the exclusion movement constituted a
major political crisis rather than an interval of anti-Catholicism
run amuck.

The king perceived the real danger of exclusion to lie,

not in the dashing of James's expectations, but in the threat to the
royal prerogative implied by exclusion.

An exclusion bill would

---~-&-
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undermine the foundations of the monarchy, rendering the king permanently dependent upon Par}iament.

By acknowledging a Parliamentary

title to the throne, the Stuart kings would finally be abandoning
the conviction that their authority and prerogatives were endowed by
God, rather than derived from the people.

Could a king with a

Parliamentary title to the throne ever exercise his prerogatives
without Parliament's consent and blesssing?

In addition to its

implied threat to the prerogative, Charles saw in the crisis the
first step in a new campaign designed to cut into his own powers.
By an examination of the Exclusion Parliaments, I will demonstrate
that the Exclusion Crisis involved far more than James's religion.
An analysis of the issues raised during the Parliaments reveals that
the campaign to exclude James from the succession was as much an
effort to redefine the limits of royal authority as it was an attempt
to protect the Church of England.

The repeated attacks members made

upon the royal prerogative bear out the king's assertion that
Shaftesbury's goals were primarily political.

In the autumn of 1678

both Houses of Parliament passed a Militia Bill which encroached
upon the king's right to control the nation's anned forces.

This

session of Parliament also witnessed an attack upon the king's right
to retain ministers at will.

The campaign to impeach the Earl of

Danby involved more than a challenge to the royal prerogative of
selecting Crown ministers.

It signaled the development of a new

political principle which threatened the power of the king--the
principle that a minister bore responsibility for unpopular, as well
as illegal, acts carried out by royal command.

~--·
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The members of the House of Commons renewed this assault on
Danby during the first Exclusion Parliament in the spring of 1679.
Addresses for the removal of Danby's associates again encroached
upon the prerogative.

The struggle over Danby's impeachment produced

another challenge to the royal prerogative, when members denied the
king's right to pardon his minister for all alleged crimes.
House of Commons proposed an

electio~

The

reform bill which required

that no Parliament sit for longer than two years.

This bill con-

stituted a direct usurpation of the king's right to detennine the
dissolution of Parliament.

A proposal that the royal guards be

replaced by the militia reflected the House of Commons' hostility

i
I

towards the monarchy.

I

challenges to the royal prerogative.

I

once again attacked ministers who encouraged the king's opposition

I
I
I

The second Exclusion Parliament offered increasingly extravagant

to exclusion.

Members of the House of Commons

A provision of the Exclusion Bill rendered the king

incapable of pardoning anyone who supported James's claim to the
throne, an act of treason according to the bill.

Commons' insistence

that an Exclusion Bill be accompanied by the creation of a Protestant

~

I

Association confirmed Charles's suspicions about the intentions of
the exclusionists.

The creation of such an Association would rob

the king of much of his authority.

Several towns, arsenals, and

ports would fall under the jurisdiction of the Association.

Parlia-

ment would supervise the appointment of men to every position of
power and influence in the nation.

_..................
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The members of the House of Commons continued their assault on
the prerogative during the short-lived third Exclusion Parliament in
the spring of 1681.

Members of the House received detailed instruc-

tions from the Whig leaders, ordering them to accept only exclusion
and to pass a bill requiring annual Parliaments.
Charles correctly perceived exclusion as a double-edged sword.
The creation of a Parliamentary title to the throne, combined with

I
I

I

I
'

I
I
I
I

measures the Whigs considered necessary to guarantee exclusion,
would result in the virtual annihilation of monarchial authority.
Although his Whig opponents denied any desire to encroach upon the
royal prerogative, the bills they proposed and the questions they
raised in Parliament indicate that the implementation of their goals
would seriously clip the wings of the monarch.
wrote in his History of His Own Time,

11

As Bishop Burnet

the King came to think that

he himself was levelled at chiefly, though for decency's sake his
brother was only named. 111

I
I
I
I

1Bishop Burnet, History of His Own Time, with notes by t~e
Earls of Dartmouth and Hardwicke, Speaker Onslow, and Dean Swift,
6 vols. (Oxford: University Press, 1833), Vol. II, p. 259.
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CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The struggle between Charles II and Parliament over the nature
and extent of the royal prerogative did not begin with the Exclusion
Crisis.

The king's prerogative right to dispense with the law

proved several times to be a point of contention between Charl e·s I I
and Parliament.

The first Declaration of Indulgence, issued late in

1662, provided such a contest.
l

In accordance with his promise to

allow liberty for tender consciences, Charles declared his intention

j

of dispensing with penal laws against the Puritans.

j

Parliament immediately made clear their hostility to such a plan.

I

The Speaker of the House of Commons infonned the king that the House

I

would never cooperate with this executive effort to effect the legal

I
I

toleration of non-Anglicans.

I
I

I

l
I

l

Both Houses of

The House of Lords voted down a bill

which would allow Charles to use his prerogative powers to dispense
with the Act of Uniformity. 2 Faced with the overwhelming opposition
of his Anglican Parliament, Charles did not press the point.
Charles faced similar Parliamentary opposition ten years later
when he issued a second Declaration of Indulgence.

Citing his

supremacy in ecclesiastical matters, Charles in March of 1672 issued
a declaration suspending penal laws against both dissenters and
2Maurice Ashley, Charles II: The Man and the Statesman (New
York: Praeger Pub 1i shers, 197I}, P:-118. - -

................... __ .
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recusants.

The declaration granted dissenters the right to

establish conventicles if they were conducted by ministers

licensed by the Crown. Catholics would be allowed to worship in
private homes.

This declaration was not merely the act of a

beneficent king, intent upon establishing religious toleration.
It was a move calculated to win support for the war with the
Dutch, which was declared just three days after the issuing of
the declaration.

Charles seriously miscalculated the reaction

to this declaration of the majority of

Englishmen~

who saw it

as part and parcel of an insidious design to give free rein to
Catholicism at home.
A disgruntled Parliament met in February of 1673.

In addition

to their anger over the Declaration of Indulgence, members were
alanned by what they perceived as other unbridled executive
actions.

Charles declared the Third Dutch War without consultation

with Parliament, and indeed he waged it partly with money voted
to support an alliance with the Dutch.

The king obtained additional

money for the war by a royal order postponing the repayment of
government debts to the bankers, a scheme known as the Stop of
the Exchequer, and which Commons condemned as unparliamentary
taxation.

The attack which members waged on the king's suspending

power reflected Parliament's displeasure with the Declaration of
Indulgence.

In addressing Charles to withdraw the declaration

the House of Commons voted "that penal statutes in matters

j

---.-...............

...

.................. ...
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ecclesiastical cannot be suspended but by Act of Parliament. 113
Charles reproached Commons for an unwarranted questioning ·Of his
ecclesiastical power, to which Commons responded:
. . . we humbly conceive your Majesty hath been very much
misinfonned; since no such power was ever claimed or exercised by any of your predecessors: and if it should be
admitted, might tend to the interrupting of the free course
of the laws, and altering of the legislative power, which
hath always been acknowledged t~ reside in your Majesty and
your two Houses of Parliament."
The House of Commons did not remain idle.

While they waited for

the king's reply to their address, members moved to express their

I

distaste for Catholicism in tangible form.

I

would later be a vociferous advocate.of exclusion, proposed that all

William Sacheverell, who

i
I

that any person who refused to take the oaths of allegiance and

I

supremacy, and to receive the sacrament according to the rites of the

I
I
I

Church of England, would be excluded from civil and military office

'

I

recusants be removed from military and civil office. 5 A bill requiring

embodied this proposal.

Charles reluctantly abandoned his Declaration

of Indulgence and consented to the Test Bill in order to obtain supply
for the continuation of the war.

In the case of both Declarations of

Indulgence, the king found it expedient to back down in the face of
overwhelming Parliamentary opposition, but he did so without openly

I
3rhomas Pitt Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History

(Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 447.
4 Ibid.

5sir George Sitwell, The First Whig: An Account of the Parliamentary Career of William Sacheverell, The Origin of the Two Great
Political Parties, and the Events Which Led QQ. to the Revolution of
1688, (Scarborough: Author's Private Press, 1894), p. 10.

..

----
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renouncing his right to suspend the law.

Parliament won a victory

without the king acknowledging defeat; the question of the extent of

the royal prerogative to suspend the law was thus left unanswered.
The king and Parliament also exchanged sharp words over the
extent of the executive power to decide questions of war and peace.
Charles resented receiving unsolicited Parliamentary advice concerning
the conduct of foreign policy.
l

I

I.
I

I
I

The Parliament which met early in

1673 took time away from their attack on the Declaration of Indulgence
to declare for peace with the Dutch and hostility to France. 6
The House of Commons sounded a similar note in May of 1677.
With only two dissenting votes, members voted an address to the king
urging an alliance with the Dutch against France. 7 The carefully
worded address implied that once Charles concluded such an alliance,

I

Commons would vote supplies sufficient to enable the king to make

I

war.

I

make war and peace, Charles replied:

I
'

I
I

I

l

Aggrieved at this encroachment upon the royal prerogative to

You have intrenched upon so undoubted a right of the Crown that
I am confident it will appear in no age (when the sword was not
drawn) that the prerogative of making peace and war hath been so
dangerously invaded.
If he consented to the address, allowing Parliament to dictate foreign
policy,

u

•••

no prince in Europe would any longer believe that the

sovereignity of England rests in the Crown. 118 The king prorogued
6wilbur C. Abbott, "The Origin of English Political Parties,"
American Historical Review, XXIV (July 1919), p. 599.
7sitwell, First Whig, p. 17.
8J.R. Tanner, En~lish Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeeth
Century, 1603-1689 Cambridge: University Press, 196~ p. 237.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · •6 ·--

•
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Parliament until January of 1678, and in the intervening months
Charles decided to conclude an alliance with the Dutch.
The House of Comnons greeted news of the Dutch alliance with
suspicion.

Sacheverell warned members that they were being deceived

by the king's apparent acquiescence to their address and openly
speculated that Charles had negotiated a secret treaty with Louis XIV. 9
Once again, Charles angrily reproached Commons for encroaching upon
a fundamental royal prerogative.

I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I

proved to be justified.

On March 20 the king assented to a tax bill

which stipulated that all money raised be expended on hostilities
against France.

Just five days later Charles instructed his ambassador

to France to ask Louis XIV for a subsidy in exchange for Charles's
guarantee that England would not go to war with France. 10
The presence in the king's counsels of unpopular ministers, a
familiar condition throughout the seventeenth century, provided
another source of conflict between the king and Parliament.

The

king's prerogative right to appoint, retain, or remove ministers at
his own discretion faced frequent Parliamentary challenges during
the reign of Charles II.

I

Commons' lack of faith in Charles II

The damage done to the prerogative by the

impeachment of the Earl of Clarendon in 1667 was twofold.

Clarendon's

I

condemnation in Parliament and his subsequent removal from office

I

encouraged politicians to obtain office by attacking rival ministers

I

I

9sitwe11, First Whig, p. 18.
1°K.H.D.· Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 48-=;-:--~

__
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in Parliament.

The Parliamentary attack on the king's chief minister,

undertaken albeit with the king's blessing, inspired members to more
frequent criticism of the conduct of government. 11 Charles unwisely
encouraged the conviction that the king should dismiss unpopular
ministers.

He exhorted Parliament to express its appreciation for

the removal of Clarendon by presenting him with an address of thanks.
Members of Parliament took this lesson to heart, for the 1670s
l

I

l

I
I

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

saw increased numbers of attacks on the king's ministers.

Parliament

watched the activities of the king and his ministers with mounting
alarm, and they soon came to feel that their most cherished liberties
and religion were under siege.

The attempted toleration of recusants

and dissenters threatened the inviolable position of the Church of
England.

Charles attempted _to circumvent the accepted means of

raising money for war by resorting to the Stop of the Exchequer.
This move endangered the House of Commons' chief means of obtaining
a voice in government, their control of the purse.

Members were

incensed by the Duke of Lauderdale's assertion that the king's
declarations had the force of law.

Many men suspected that the

Treaty of Dover contained secret clauses providing for the restoration of Catholicism and the establishment of absolutism in England
by means of French anns.

Louis XIV's successes on the continent

cast a threatening shadow over English religion and liberties.
These developments led members of Parliament to turn against those
11 clayton Roberts, The Growth of Responsible Government in
Stuart England (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), p. 171.

13

ministers whom they held responsible for dangerous executive policies,
and to challenge the king's prerogative to select and retain ministers
at his own discretion.
The ire of Parliament destroyed the working relationship of the
Cabal, an acronym for the first letters of the names of the leading
ministers:

Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley and Lauderdale.

The Cabal ministers escaped impeachment early in 1673 only when
Charles withdrew his offending Declaration of Indulgence. The Test
Act forced the Catholic Clifford to resign from office. 12 Ashley
(the future Earl of Shaftesbury) defected to the opposition, and in
l

I

November of 1673 was asked to deliver up his seals of office to the
king. 13 Arlington survived ~n attempted impeachment, but lost much

I
I

of his political influence and resigned from office in June of
1674. 14 Despite Buckingham's obsequious attempts to exculpate

I

himself from all blame for policies of the Cabal government, Commons

I

in 1673 and 1674 voted addresses to Charles asking for his removal.

I
I

Charles dismissed Buckingham, but not to propitiate Parliament.

I

I
I
I

I

During Buckingham's futile attempt to exonerate himself before
Commons, he had violated his oath of secrecy as a Privy Councillor. 15
12 Maurice Lee, Jr., The Cabal (Urbana:
Press, 1965), p. 225. ~
13 Haley, First Earl, p. 34·2.

University of Illinois

14 Keith Feiling, A Histor~ of the To(Y Part~, 1640-1714
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 24T,-P:- 15 .
15 Roberts, Growth, p. 191.

14

Parliament bore a deep-seated enmity for the Duke of Lauderdale,
the king's governor in Scotland.

They feared that he advised

Charles to establish arbitrary government in England, and that he
offered to provide Scottish troops to support such an effort.
Commons voted five addresses to the king asking for the removal of
Lauderdale.

These addresses constituted a direct attack on the

king's prerogative right to choose his own ministers.

Lauderdale

survived all of the addresses voted against him.

I
I

The king's prerogative right to choose his ministers was a

l

I
I

source of much contention between king and Parliament in the decade
preceding the Exclusion Crisis.

With the coming of the Exclusion

Crisis the nature of Parliamentary attacks on royal ministers changed,

I
I
I

and a new principle of ministerial responsibility developect. 16

I

1670s.

I

mechanism for forcing the king to call Parliament after the appoint-

I
I

I
I

l

The king's prerogative right to summon, prorogue and dissolve
Parliament at will also came under critical scrutiny during the
A modified Triennial Act, passed in 1664, contained no

ed interval and so was ineffective.

Opponents of the Earl of Danby,

who managed Parliament for the king in the mid-1670s, sought to
force the king to dissolve Parliament, allowing for the creation of
an ungovernable Parliament.

In their campaign to effect a dissolution,

they repeatedly challenged the king's right to control the timing of
sessions of Parliament.
16 Ibid., pp. 223-224.

- -........................ +
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Acting with Shaftesbury's blessing, Sacheverell in April of
1675 proposed to the House of Commons that sessions of Parliament

should not be terminated until all business was completed. He
defended this assertion by referring to precedents from the reigns
of Edward III, Richard II, and Henry IV.

This proposal constituted

a direct attack· on the king's prerogative to adjourn Parliament at
will.

Despite Sdcheverell's best efforts, his proposal met with

little enthusiasm from the rank and file members of the House.
The two Houses of Parliament became embroiled in a dispute over

i

I

I
I

I
I
I
I
I

I

I
I

I
i

I

their privileges, and in the ensuing deadlock gave little attention
to other Parliamentary business.

Charles recognized that it was in

the best interests of his opponents to instigate the quarrel, and he
considered it to be another ploy aimed at forcing a dissolution.

He

called upon the two Houses to mend their disagreement, and warned
them, "But I must let you know, that whilst you are in debate about
your pri vi 1eges, I wi 11 not suffer my own to be invaded . . . 1117
The two Houses refused to heed the king's call for a reconciliation
and on June 9 he prorogued Parliament.
When Parliament reassembled in October, the initiative in the
campaign to win a dissolution passed to the House of Lords.

On

November 20, Lord Mohun moved that an address be presented to Charles,
requesting that Parliament be dissolved since the quarrel over their
privileges prevented the two Houses from working together.

The

17 sir Arthur Bryant, ed., The Letters, Speeches and Declarations

of Charles

11 (London: Cassell,

1968), p. 282.

~
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majority of the temporal lords supported the motion, but the bishops,
as a body, voted against it. The motion failed, 50 to 47. 18 Two

days later Charles prorogued Parliament, and left it in abeyance for
fifteen months.
When Parliament next met in February of 1677, Shaftesbury used
the long prorogation as the basis for his bid for a dissolution.

He

argued that a prorogation of more than twelve.months was illegal and
based his contention upon two acts of Edward III, which called for
annual Parliaments.

These two acts had been ignored in framing the

Triennial Acts of 1641 and 1664, and so had not been stricken from
the books. 19 Shaftesbury, Buckingham, Salisbury, and Wharton spoke
in favor of a motion for dissolution, but failed to win over most of
their comrades in the House.

By a vote of 53 to 30, the four lords

were ordered to withdraw from the House.

When they refused to

apologize for their proposal, the Lords dispatched them to the
Tower. 21 Shaftesbury remained there for a full year before pressing
developments obliged the Earl to grit his teeth and apologize, to
win his freedom.
In the course of their campaign to win a dissolution of Parliament, Shaftesbury's party published a pamphlet in 1675 entitled
"Some Considerations Upon the Question Whether the Parliament is
18 A.S. Turberville, "The House of Lords Under Charles II,
"English Historical Review, XLIV (July 1929), p. 413.
19 Ibid., p. 414.
20 Haley, First Earl, p. 418.
21

Ibid., p. 414.

17

Dissolved." This pamphlet not only challenged the king's prerogative
to decide upon the dissolution of Parliament; it also asserted that
Parliament possessed the authority to alter the succession to the
Crown.

The pamphlet argued that acts of Parliament could restrict

the prerogative as well as "bind, limit, restrain and govern the
descent and inheritance of the Crown itself, and all rights and
titles thereto. 1122 The author of the pamphlet is unknown. Shaftesbury
denied responsibility for its claim that Parliament possessed the
power to alter the succession, but Buckingham insisted that Shaftesbury
wrote the offending clause.
The publication of the pamphlet was not the first hint that
some members of Parliament were considering encroaching on the most
sacrosanct of royal institutions--the principle of hereditary
succession to the throne of England.

In the summer of 1673, six

years before the first Exclusion Parliament, Charles confided to the
French ambassador his fears that Parliament might introduce bills to
send James into exile and to exclude Catholic princes from the
succession.

Even at this early date, Charles expressed doubts over

whether he could trust Shaftesbury (then Lord Chancellor) to defend
James's right to succeed his brother.
For many years, rumors that the heir presumptive to the throne
had secretly converted to Catholicism circulated throughout England.
James's refusal to participate in the Anglican sacrament at Easter
22Ibid.' p. 331.
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1673 transfonned whispered speculation into a universal conviction
that James had fallen under the sway of Catholicism.

The prospect of a Catholic monarch filled the hearts of Englishmen
with dread.

Few words were so widely despised in 17th century

England as that of "Papist." Catholics were viewed as desperate
plotters, willing to subvert any law of man or morality in order to
bring England back to the Catholic fold.

One need look no farther

for evidence of Catholic perfidy than to the attempted assassinations
of Queen Elizabeth, the Gunpowder Plot of 1605, the Irish massacre
of 1641, and the Great Fire of 1666.

A Catholic monarch would rely

for advice on the Jesuits to reconvert England.

Many believed these

fanatical soldiers of the pope would stain the country with Protestant
blood in their quest for orthodoxy.

The succession of a Catholic to

the throne would endanger Englishmen's religion, liberties, property
and lives.

The outbreak of the Popish Plot in 1678 allowed Shaftesbury

and his associates to direct this deep and pervasive hatred of
Catholicism to political ends.
"Fear of the Duke of York makes them everyday fetter the
Crown. 1123

Edward, third Viscount Conway described the activities of

Parliament in early 1674 with these words.

Shaftesbury and his

fellows sought to exaggerate the dangers posed by a Catholic heir in
order to build up a case for exclusion.

During a debate on religion,

Shaftesbury warned that there were 16,000 anned Catholics in London
23Ibid., p. 359.
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and he asked the lords to devise a method of protecting the Protestant
population from massacre.

With only James and two others dissenting,

the Lords voted an address asking the king to remove all Catholics
from London.
A committee of the House of Lords prepared a bill designed to
protect the country from the possibility of a Catholic monarch.

The

bill required that all of James's children be educated as Protestants,
stipulated that in the future neither the king nor any prince could
marry a Catholic without the consent of Parliament, and removed all
English Catholic priests from Queen Catherine's presence.
The committee raised the possibiltiy of exclusion from the
succession during the preparation of the bill.

The committee suggested

that if any prince were to marry a Catholic without Parliament's
consent, the penalty would be exclusion.
called the proposal diabolical.

The Archbishop of York

The disapprobation of the episcopate

caused the proposal to be dropped.
While the House of Lords debated the feasibility of exclusion,
the Commons detennined to fetter any king's ability to establish an
absolute government.

The first Habeas Corpus bill received three

readings in the first two months of 1674.

The voting of an address

asking the king to dismiss all troops raised since January of 1663
reflected the fear that the king might use a standing anny to
establish an arbitrary government.

Another bill proposed that

20
judges hold office during good behavior, and no longer merely at the
royal pleasure. 24
None of the bills proposed in Lords or Commons became law,
however, for Charles suddenly prorogued Parliament on February 24.
The French ambassador sent this report of its adjournment back to
his master:
Parliament was prorogued, as one expected, but what
surprised everyone was that it was done so suddenly, without
warning Par.l iament of it, or consul ting the Council. The
King prorogued Parliament because its deliberations tended
to lessen his power •. 25 and it refused to do anything
towards voting supply. 11
Despite the Earl of Danby's efforts to assuage Anglican criticism
of the government's religious proclivities, Parliament remained
suspicious of the king's devotion to the established church and
openly hostile to James.
Danby attempted to detract attention from James's Catholicism
by introducing a bill in June of 1677 limiting the powers of a
Catholic king.

The bill required all future monarchs to disavow

any belief in transubstantiation.

Any king who refused to do so

would surrender his right to appoint bishops and would relinquish
the supervision of his children's education· to a panel of bishops. 26
Most members of Parliament felt that these limitations were inadequate
to protect English religion and liberties from violation at the
24 Ibid., pp. 354-360.
25 Roberts, Growth, pp. 195-196.
26 Feiling, History Tory, p. 166.
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hands of a Catholic monarch.

This criticism of the policy of

limitations would be heard again during the Exclusion Crisis, when

the King offered limitations as an alternative to exclusion.
Fed by James's conversion, the king's Catholic mistress,
Louis XIV's successes on the continent and fears about secret clauses
in the Treaty of Dover, anti-Catholic hysteria grew apace in the
1670s.

1678 saw the publication of Andrew Marvell's pamphlet

"Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government in England."
In addition to decrying the spread of Catholicism, he commented on
the still unresolved question of the nature and extent of the royal
prerogative.

Marvell clearly favored a very limited definition of

the prerogative when he declared, "the King's very Prerogative is no
more that that what the Law has determined. 1127
Shaftesbury realized that the burgeoning anti-Catholic hysteria
could work to his political advantage.

His best interests could be

served by building distrust of the heir's Catholicism to a fever
pitch.

William Russell, his close ally in the House of Commons,

assisted in this endeavor.

While foreign affairs preoccupied most

· members of the House, Russell worked to direct their attention to
the dangers of Catholicism.

On March 16, 1678 Russell proposed the

setting aside of a day for a debate on the growth and progress of
Popery in England. 28 Realizing that an attack on James would ensue,
27 Antonia Fraser, Royal Charles: Charles .!land the Restoration
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 345.
·
28 Haley, First Earl, p. 445.
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Danby managed to schedule the debate so that it fell on the day
Parliament was to be adjourned.

Shaftesbury took command of the assault on James's position
that the opposition carried out in the House of Lords.

He warned

his fellow lords that priests and Jesuits did not constitute the
greatest danger to England; this distinction he reserved for James.
Without mentioning the Duke by name, Shaftesbury spoke of "those who
live in this city and apply themselves to an arbitrary government
and to introduce the Catholic religion entirely. 1129 With a significant
gesture, he indicated that James was the object of this description.
Shaftesbury wanted to prevent the establishment of an arbitrary
government in England.

As he assessed the developments of the

1670s, Shaftesbury saw increasing evidence that the policies of the
Crown boded ill for English liberties.

During the Cabal ministry

the executive had attempted to rule by reliance upon the royal
prerogative:

toleration by royal edict, finance by royal order,

frequent prorogations of Parliament, an unpopular foreign policy.
Danby sought to put the Crown's financial situation on such sure
footing that the king need not depend upon Parliamentary grants of
money.

A Parliament without financial leverage would be well on its

way towards extinction, as evidenced by the fate of the Estates
General in France.
29Ibid., p. 448.
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Each time Charles II and Parliament clashed over the scope of
the royal prerogative, its extent was left undefined.

Charles

abandoned his Declarations of Indulgence, but he refused to foreswear
his right to suspend the law in ecclesiastical matters.

He would

not abandon his control over foreign policy, his right to control
the timing of Parliament, or his power to retain or dismiss ministers
of the Crown.

The nature and scope of the royal prerogative were

still a source of contention between king and Parliament in the
summer of 1678.

The eruption in August of the Popish Plot confirmed

everyone's worst suspicions about the dangers of Catholicism.

The

Plot offered a new opportunity for Shaftesbury and his associates to
avert the creation of an absolute government by defining the rights
and roles of both king and Parliament to Parliament's advantage.

'·

CHAPTER I I I
THE END OF THE CAVALIER PARLIAMENT:
It was 1a familiar tale:

PRELUDE TO EXCLUSION

a Jesuit plot to murder the king, to

place a compliant James on the throne, and then to force England
back into the Catholic fold.

Yet this hackneyed story of Catholic

villainy electrified the nation in the autumn of 1678, when a
string of coincidences and mishaps lent credence to the announcement
of the discovery of a new Popish Plot.
The outbreak of the Popish Plot ushered in a new Parliamentary
campaign to limit the prerogative.

There is no evidence that

Shaftesbury had a hand in the creation of the Plot, despite the fact
that a new outbreak of anti-Catholic hysteria would perfectly suit
Shaftesbury's purposes.

The discoveries were made public in the

I

politically inactive month of August, hardly a propitious time for
uniting religious zeal with political industry. 30 Shaftesbury was
not the father of the Plot, but he quickly recognized the advantages
to be gained in bringing attention to the dangers of Catholicism and
a Catholic heir.

If the furor over the discovery of Catholic perfidy

could be skilfully orchestrated and directed, Shaftesbury believed
he could force the king to accept the exclusion of his brother from
30 J.R. Jones, Country and Court, England, 1658-1714 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 199.
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the succession.

This one act would remove the man Shaftesbury

regarded as the chief agent of arbitrary government in England.

By

changing the underlying assumptions about the basis of monarchial
claims to power, it would also be a major step in the settling of
unresolved constitutional questions.

It would be far easier to clip

the wings of a monarch with a Parliamentary title to the throne,
than to restrict the prerogatives of a king who still claimed accountability only to God.

During the course of the Exclusion Crisis, the

king's Whig opponents also continued their campaign to limit the
prerogatives of the present king.

Members challenged the king's

authority over the armed forces, and they encroached upon his right
to retain ministers at his own discretion.
While strolling through a park in mid-August, Charles was
approached by a gentleman of the court who warned the king of a new
Jesuit scheme against his life.

Charles discounted the story, but

Danby persuaded him to submit it to a cursory investigation.

On the

28th and 29th of September, Titus Oates, the father of the Plot,
testified before the Privy Council.

A most convincing liar, Oates

regaled the councillors with a painstakingly detailed account of the
Jesuit plot to murder the king.

The wealth of infonnation he provided

combined with his personal bravura persuaded most councillors that
the matter warranted further investigation.

Accordingly, the

Council ordered the arrest of all suspects named by Oates.
After his first meeting with Oates, Charles knew that the man
was a liar.

Charles attended the Council's interrogation of Oates,

where he caught Oates in several lies.

He asked Oates to describe

26

Don John of Spain, supposedly a key figure in the Plot.

Oates

described Don John as a tall, dark haired man, whereas he actually

was a short redhead. Oates also gave an incorrect description of
the site of the Jesuit house in Paris.

Had he dared, Charles could

have exposed Oates for the prevaricator that he was.

Oates claimed

that the details of the assassination plot had been worked out
during a Jesuit consult held at the White Horse Tavern on April 24.
Supposedly hired as a go-between for the conspirators, Oates claimed
to have played along with them until he had accumulated sufficiently
incriminating evidence against them.
so.

Charles knew that this was not

A Jesuit consult had been held in London on April 24, but Oates

had had no part in it.

With Charles's knowledge, the Jesuits had

met in James's quarters at St. James's Palace, hardly infonnation
that Charles could impart to his Council. 31
Charles believed that Oates was a tool of Shaftesbury's, carefully coached to incriminated Catholics in general and James in
particular.

The king confided this belief to Bishop Burnet, who

wrote this report of their discussion:
We agreed in one thing, that the greatest part of the
evidence was a contrivance. But he suspected, some had set
on Oates, and instructed him: and he named the earl of
Shaftsbury. I was of another mind. I thought the many
gross things in his narrative shewed, there was ~~ abler
head than Oates, or Tonge, in the framing of it.
31 Haley, First Earl, p. 454.
32 surnet, History, p. 171.

27

Although Oates lied about the Plot, one of the men he named as
a conspirator did have an incriminating past.

Edward Coleman, a

former secretary to the Duke of York, had devoted himself to the
cause of re-Catholicizing England.

He had carried on a very indiscreet

correspondence with two of Louis XIV's confessors, Fathers Ferrier
and LeChaise.

When warned that Oates had named him as a principal

conspirator, Coleman destroyed much of this correspondence, but
unaccountably kept letters from 1674, 1675, and 1676.

In selecting

Coleman as a conspirator, Oates had accidentally named a man who
would give plausibility to the stories of a Catholic plot.

The

discovery of the contents of Coleman's letters damned him and
confirmed everyone's worst suspicions about James's intentions.

In one of his letters Coleman had written:
We have here a mighty work upon our hands, no less than the
conversion of three kingdoms . . . . There never were such
hopes of success since the days of Queen Mary, as now in our
days, when God has given us a prince, who is become (I may
say by miracle) zealous of be~~g the author and instrument
of so glorious a work.
James denied that he had given Coleman any reason to hope for
his cooperation in the re-Catholicizing of England, but no one
believed him.

The revelations of Coleman's letters ultimately

provided the groundwork for the case for exclusion.
the Council read Coleman's letters on October 4.

A committee of

The Council

33 Lord John Russell, The Life of William, Lord Russell,
2 vols. ·(London: Longman.Hurst, Rees, Onne and Brown, -1°820),
Vol. 1, p. 131.
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turned the matter over for investigation to Parliament, which was
scheduled to meet later in the month.

The mysterious death of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey shortly before
Parliament met further enhanced the fury caused by Coleman's letters.
Godfrey, a well-known magistrate, had received Oates's deposition
concerning the Plot.

In early October he disappeared, and on the

17th his body was discovered in a ditch.

Londoners assured them-

selves that he had been murdered by the Jesuits in an attempt to
halt the discovery of their plot.

(Hardly likely, since a copy of

Oates's deposition had been filed with the Privy Council as well as
with Godfrey.) 34 Whether the result of murder or suicide, Godfrey's
death appeared to most Englishmen as the final confirmation of the
existence of the Popish Plot.
Parliament opened on October 21 in an atmosphere of crisis, and
members took upon themselves the investigation of the Plot.

The

House of Commons immediately appointed two committees, one to consider
ways of preserving the king's safety and another to investigate
Godfrey's death.

Detennined to exploit the Plot for political

advantage, Shaftesbury and his associates did all in their power to
elevate public hysteria.

Parliament sent Sir Christopher Wren to

search for explosives in the vaults under Parliament and Whitehall.
The members decreed a general day of fasting in order "to implore
the mercy and Protection of Allmighty God to his Majesties Royal
34Ashley, Charles 11, p. 232.
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Person, and in him to all His Loyal Subjects. 1135 Members publ ically
chided a fireworks manufacturer for keeping dangerous explosives in
his house.
Both houses of Parliament exploited the public furor over the
Plot in order to justify their usurpation of executive action. 36
The Lord Mayor was instructed to increase security precautions in
the city.

Parliament offered a reward of L20 for the apprehension

of any priest or Jesuit.

Parliament issued orders forbidding any

Englishmen to attend the chapels of Catholic ambassadors, who were
themselves forbidden to keep more than four priests in attendance.
The House of Commons sent the Privy Council a list of suspects whose
names the House wanted made public in a proclamation.

On the

24th of October, the House of Commons ordered the Lord Chief Justice
to issue warrants for the arrest of the five Catholic peers named by
Oates as leading conspirators.
On October 26, the House of Commons asked the king to expel all
recusants from royal palaces. Two days later the House took steps
to expel Catholics from Parliament.

Commons sent the House of Lords

a bill requiring all members of Parliament to swear an oath against
transubstantiation and the worship of the Virgin. 37
35 Francis S. Reynolds, The Attempted Whig Revolution of 16781681 (Rowman and Littlefield, 1937; reprint ed. Totowa, New
Jersey: Boydell Press, 1974), p. 19.
36 Jones, Country and Court, p. 202·.
37 rurberville, "House of Lords," p. 415.
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The initiative in the Parliamentary plan to nullify the dangers
of Catholicism did not all belong to the House of Commons.

Shaftesbury

~

suggested on November 2 that James be removed from the king's Council
and presence.

Charles perceived that such a proposal could constitute

the first step down the path towards the exclusion of James from the
succession.

He ordered James to keep a low profile and instructed

Danby to prevent a similar motion from being raised in Commons.
Danby's ability to manage Commons had long been on the wane.

In

spite of his best efforts, on November 4 Commons brought forward a
motion for the removal of James from the king's presence and Council.
In the course of the debate over this motion, the House of Commons
first raised the possibility of exclusion, when Sacheverell asked
the assembly:
I would have the Gentlemen of the Long Robe tell me . . . whether
the King and Parliament may not dispose of the Succession of
the Crown~ and wether it be not Praemunire to say the
contrary? 8
Such a question alarmed the king, who realized that if he were
forced to abandon James he would be opening the way for restrictions
on his own prerogative.

In an effort to forestall any discussion

of exclusion, Charles appeared before both Houses of Parliament on
November 9.

The king assured members of his devotion to the safety

of the Protestant church, and promised his ready consent to any
reasonable bills designed to ensure their safety.

The king set his

38 Anchitell Grey, Esq., Debates in the House of Commons, from
the Year 1667 to the yejr 1694, 10 volS:-(The Strand: T. Becket
and P.A. De Hondt-;-f769 , V0T:"" VI, p. 148.
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face against exclusion when he added the important qualification:
• . . so as they tend not to impeach the right of Succession, nor the Descent of the Crown in the true Line; and so
as they restrain not his Power, nor the just Rights of any

Protestant successor.

Sacheverell ridiculed the King's speech, calling it "a rattle
to keep us qui et. 11 He added,

11

If we have no Security that the

Successor shall be a Protestant, you sit down, and can do nothing
effectually. 1139
Sir Edward Seymour, Speaker of the House of Commons, on November 22 expounded on the king's proposal that the powers of a
Catholic successor be limited.
with the words

Warning members against exclusion

"It is not in your interest to make the heir of the

Crown desperate," he recommended specific limitations on the powers
of any Catholic king.
I would not scruple to take from him dependencies in Church
or State, and power to dispose of the public revenue or the
militia. I would not scruple to make a law, that upon the
demise of the King the Parliament then sitting or, if there
be none, that the last Parli4~ent, shall meet again and
continue for a time certain.
The fate of the House of Commons' bill calling for the exclusion of Catholics from membership in Parliament provided a valuable
·lesson about the worth of restrictive legislation in settling the
succession problem. 41 An emasculated Test Bill passed in the House
39 Ibid., p. 172.

4oIbid. , p. 265.

41 Haley, First Earl, p. 482.
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of Lords on November 20.

After three weeks of haggling, the royalist

majority in Lords managed to insert an amendment onto the bill which

vitiated much of the bill's original intent. The amendment exempted
James from being disqualified for membership in Parliament on the
grounds of his Catholicism.

Shaftesbury's associates in the House

of Commons were not yet strong enough to command a telling opposition
to the amended bill.

Despite their best efforts, it squeaked by in

the Commons by two votes.

In order to gain control of the House of

Commons, Shaftesbury's confederates needed to link fear of Catholicism
with the dangers of arbitrary government. 42
The House of Commons soon found reason to question the sincerity
of the king's promise to do everything possible to protect the
Protestant religion.
of anned Catholics.

Few images alanned Englishmen more than that
According to the Test Act of 1673, all Catholics

were to be denied commissions in the anny.

The House of Commons

discovered that Secretary of State Williamson had dispensed Catholic
officers from the oath required by the Test Act, as well as countersigning orders granting Catholics anny commissions.
done so under orders from the king.

Williamson had

Incensed by this violation of

the Test Act, Commons clapped Williamson into the Tower.
following day, Charles released his secretary.

On the

This act convinced

many members of Parliament that his promise to defend the faith was
valueless.

Williamson was so intimidated by his day in custody that

42 J.R. Jones, The First Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion
Crisis, 1678-1683~ew York, Toronto, and London: Oxford University
Press, 1961), p. 27.
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he thenceforth refused to expedite any illegal orders given him by
the king.

His timidity cost him his job, for Charles dismissed him

in February of 1679.

Williamson's dismissal for his refusal to

carry out illegal orders reflected a new development in the relationship
between the king, his ministers, and Parliament. 43 During the
course of the Exclusion Crisis, it became increasingly difficult for
the king to exact obedience from his ministers, who discovered that
the king could not always protect them from the ire of Parliament.
The years of the Exclusion Crisis witnessed an acceleration in
Parliament's campaign to restrict the king's prerogative right to
determine the selection and retention of his ministers.
The autumn of 1678 saw another Parliamentary attempt to encroach
upon the prerogatives of the monarch.

Parliament was determined to

protect the nation from a Catholic uprising, and decided that the
militia must be kept in a state of readiness.

Both Houses of Parliament

gave speedy passage to a bill which invested the deputy lieutenants
with the authority to keep the militia in being for 42 days.

On the

same day that Charles gave reluctant consent to the new Test Bill,
he vetoed the Militia Bill.

The king expressed his detennination

not to acquiesce to any Parliamentary usurpation of royal power.
told the members:
. . . for the right of the Militia being in the Crown, he
would not consent to ~ijY Act that might put it out, though
but for half an hour.
43 Roberts, Growth, pp. 224-225.
44 Grey, Debates, Vol. VI, p. 301.
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Burnet concurred with the king's fear that the Militia Bill
constituted a thinly veiled attack on the prerogative.
I found some of them hoped, when that bill passed into a
law, they would be more masters; and that the militia would
not separat~~ till all the demands of the two houses should
be granted.
As the session progressed, Oates's claims grew more extravagant.
On November 24 he accused Queen Catherine and her physician Wakeman
of complicity in the plot to assassinate the king.

Charles knew

this to be patently absurd, and he did all in his power to protect
his wife from Oates's incriminations.

He could not help other

innocents accused by Oates of collusion in the Popish Plot.

Trials

for participation in the Plot began in November and netted, among
others, Jesuits, a Catholic banker, and, of course, Coleman.
The king's rejection of the Militia Bill provoked a furious
attack on Danby, whom many held accountable for the king's decision
to veto the bill.

By a vote of 138 to 114, the House of Commons on

December 2 carried an address to the king, requesting that he
remove Danby from office and court and that he stop taking private
counsels. 46 Commons wanted the Crown's ministers to be held
accountable for the advice that they offered the king.

They sought

to establish more clearly ministers' responsibility by requiring
that all counsel be given publicly.

This, again, was part of the

ongoing process of making ministers accountable to Parliament for
45 Burnet, History, p. 171.
46 Andrew Browning, ed., Memoirs of Sir John Reresby (Glascow:
Jackson, Son, and Co., 1936), p. 161:- - - -
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their actions.
Few things would delight Shaftesbury as much as the opportunity

to pillory the Earl of Danby. Members of the House of Cotmlons
expressed their hostility to Danby by voting that the money voted
for the disbandment of the anny be distributed by the Chamber of
London, rather than by the Exchequer, the province of Lord Treasurer
Danby. 47 An opportunity to bring down the powerful earl soon presented
itself to Danby's opponents.

Mid-December brought a scandal which

rocked the nation and which finally allowed Shaftesbury to enlarge
the scope of his attack to include both Catholicism and arbitrary
government.
Deep animosity existed between Danby and Ralph Montagu, the
English ambassador to the court of Louis XIV.

Montagu blamed Danby

for his failure to obtain the Secretaryship of State.

As long as

the two men were required to work together, their enmity was held in
check.

Once Montagu lost his place in the king's affairs, he

released the full force of his fury against Danby.
confinned womanizer.

Montagu was a

While in Paris he had seduced both Barbara,

Duchess of Cleveland (the king's former mistress) and her daughter
by Charles, Anne, Countess of Sussex.

The discovery that Montagu

was dallying with her daughter infuriated Barbara, who indignantly
complained to Charles of Montagu's debauchery of their daughter.
47 surnet, History, pp. 173-174.

36

Montagu crossed to England to defend himself against Barbara's
accusations, and Charles dismissed him for leaving his post without
permission. 48
Montagu had prepared himself for such a day by caching away
incriminating correspondence between Charles II and Louis XIV.

He

sought to expose these letters, written by Danby at Charles's
command, in order to end Danby's political career.

Montagu first

got himself elected to Parliament and thus won immunity for the
attack he intended to launch against Danby.

Sunnising Montagu's

intentions, Danby hastily summoned William Temple from Holland to
run against Montagu for a vacant seat in the House of Commons.
After defeating Temple, Montagu quickly turned his attention towards
effecting the ruin of his old enemy.
Danby sensed the unfavorable temper of the House of Commons and
attempted to avert the attack by seizing Montagu's papers.

Charles

sent a message to Commons informing them of his intention of bringing
Montagu to trial on the charge of plotting to bring in Catholicism. 49
The king and Danby hoped to find the incriminating letters among
those papers seized as part of the bogus investigation.

Once they

had destroyed the letters, the charges against Montagu would be
dropped for lack of evidence.

This scheme failed because the

critical letters eluded Danby's search.
48 Fraser, Royal Charles, p. 365.
49 surnet, History, p. 175.
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As the House of Commons angrily decried the seizure of Montagu's
papers, Montagu brought

~rth

his evidence.· His audience could not

have been more receptive. Here was proof positive of Danby's double
dealings.

In a letter dated March 25, 1678, Danby instructed then-

ambassador Montagu to offer Louis XIV a guarantee that England would
not go to war against France if, in exchange, Louis paid Charles a
handsome subsidy.

This letter had been written just five days after

the king had assented to a bill designed to raise money for a war
with France.

This revelation made all the more plausible the fears

that Charles had a secret understanding with Louis XIV, aimed at
restoring England to the Catholic fold and creating an arbitrary
government.

Sir John Reresby described the fears raised by Montagu's

disclosure:
. . . to advise the King to take mony to raise an army for
warr, and at the same time to treat for mony from France to
make a peace, which looked as if a standing arm~0 was designed
to enslave us at home, not to make warr abroad.
The House of Commons quickly moved from furious denunciation
of Danby's conduct to impeachment.

Danby's supporters argued that

the earl could not be accused of treason, since his actions violated
no statute of treason.

They pointed out that the king had authorized

the writing of the letters, and argued that the king had the right
to select anyone he pleased to transmit his orders to his ministers
50 srowning, Reresby, p. 164.
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abroad. 51 These arguments failed to sway the majority of the
members of the House, who voted 179 to 116 that there was sufficient
evidence for an impeachment.
Danby.

The Commons passed six articles against

They accused him of usurping royal power by discussing with

foreign ministers the possibility of peace with France, without the
knowledge of other privy councillors.

They charged him with alienating

the government from the people by advising the king to raise an anny
under the pretense of preparing for war.

Commons levelled against

Danby the ridiculous charge that he was popishly affected.

They

asserted that he had alienated Charles from his people by negotiating
with Louis XIV for a subsidy. 52
Two days before Christmas, members of Commons carried the
impeachment of Danby to the House of Lords.

Danby attempted to

exonerate himself by claiming that he had acted only on the king's
orders.

A heated debate followed, but Shaftesbury's arguments

against Danby failed to carry the House. The Lords resolved that
before they would proceed with the impeachment, the House of Commons
must prove that the charges levelled against Danby constituted high
treason.

The Lords provided further evidence that they were not

prepared to abandon Danby.

On December 23 they rejected a mo ti on

that Danby should withdraw from the House since he stood under the
threat of impeachment. 53 Three days later they expressed their
51 Burnet, History, p. 177.
52 srowning, Reresby, p. 165.
53 Ashley, Charles .!l, p. 239.
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confidence in Lord Treasurer Danby by insisting that money voted for
the disbandment of the army be paid into the Exchequer, not the
Chamber of London. 54 On the following day, the Lords voted that
Danby should not be committed to custody. 55
The question of Danby's guilt had thrown the two Houses of
Parliament into a deadlock.
from Danby's control.

The House of Commons finally had slipped

The obstreperous opposition, which now

domi~ated

Commons, on more than one occasion had expressed hostility towards
both James and the royal prerogative.

Charles believed that it

would finally be in his own best interest to send them packing.
After the recent revelations of royal duplicity, the king's chances
of obtaining money from the House of Commons were nonexistent.
Worse yet, any close investigation of Danby's career might bring to
light other secret negotiations between Charles II and Louis XIV.
If the secret clauses of the Treaty of Dover were made public,
Charles feared that his tenure on the throne would be threatened.
The English would not take kindly to the discovery that their king
had promised to declare himself a Catholic and to accept the support
of French troops if his subjects proved unwilling to accept his

I
I:
I
I
l

conversion.

Accordingly, on December 30 Charles prorogued Parliament.

54 Jones, First Whigs, p. 33.
55 srowning, Reresby, p. 167.
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Reresby wrote:
When it was least expected the King proroagued the Parlament
to the 4th of February, some said in favour of the papists,
others of the Lord Treasurer, others in defense of his
prerogative, which was mor5 then one way invaded by the
proceeding of the Commons. 6
Charles infonned his Council that he intended to set up a committee
to investigate the Plot.

By this means he hoped to escape any

accusations that he had prorogued Parliament in order to protect
In spite of this, rumors soon circulated that the king

Catholics.

intended to give respite to Catholics condemned for participation
in the Plot.
After the prorogation, Charles turned his attention to the
problem of money.

The French king saw no need to ease Charles's financial

subsidy.
burden.

Louis XIV coldly rejected his appeal for another

Pro-Dutch Danby was in disgrace; Charles was at loggerheads

with his Parliament. 57

Little would be gained from playing paymaster

to a rival king who could offer nothing substantial in exchange for
French largesse.
The search for money led Charles and Danby to negotiate with
moderate members of the opposition.

I
I

I
~

I

struck a bargain.

After much negotiation, they

The moderates agreed to temper the anticipated

Parliamentary attack on Danby, and to secure a vote of supply in
the next session.

Their price for cooperation was high.

Danby

56 Ibid.

57

clyde L. Grose, "Louis XIV's Financial Relations with
Charles II and the English Parliament," Journal of Modern History,
Vol. 1 (June 1929), p. 199.
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must resign from office, James would be required to leave
the country, and the king must dissolve the Cavalier

Parliament. On the surface, it appeared that the king had
been driven to surrender his prerogative to decide when
and if Parliament would be dissolved.

This was not the case, for

Charles had already decided that this now combative Parliament must
go.

He hoped that elections would bring more moderate men to the

House of Commons, a serious miscalculation, as the coming months
would show.
On January 24, 1679, Charles II dissolved the Cavalier Parliament,
an end to which Shaftesbury had worked for the better part of a
decade.

When Parliament next sat the conflict between the court and

the opposition would deepen, as Shaftesbury accelerated his campaign
to prevent the possible imposition of an arbitrary government.

In

the coming months Shaftesbury and his associates would assault the
most inviolable of royal institutions--the
· the throne.

h~reditary

succession to

~

CHAPTER IV
THE FIRST EXCLUSION PARLIAMENT
Shaftesbury continued his campaign to limit the prerogative
during the first Exclusion Parliament.

The king found the members

of the newly elected House of Commons to be most intractable.
Their impeachment of Danby brought forth a challenge to the royal
right to issue pardons.

They further developed the principle that

Crown ministers must accept responsibility for unpopular as well
as illegal executive actions.

An election refonn bill, proposed

in Commons, invaded the prerogative by attempting to limit the
life of any Parliament to two years.

Charles's hope that the

Parliamentary elections would bring more moderate men into Parliament
proved unfounded.
A keen competition for seats marked the Parliamentary elections
of February, 1679.

The intensity of the competition was caused

not by any political issues, but by the fact that it had been
eighteen years since the last general election. Many of the
members elected in 1661 had long since abandoned any effort to
maintain the support of their electorate. Their base of support
had dwindled from neglect.

With the sudden calling of new elections,

members faced competition from a new generation of aspiring politicians.
The furor caused by the outbreak of the Popish Plot and the revelations
of the Crown's secret dealings with Louis XIV did nothing to aid

1
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in the re-election of court dependents.

Still, exclusion was not a

telling issue in the elections of early 1679; the elections were
detennined by local· interests.
Charles II made a serious error in judgment when he predicted
that the new elections would bring a more temperate body of men to
the House of Commons.

Over 320 seats in the House changed hands.

In an attempt to assess the strength of the opposition, Shaftesbury
carefully studied the results of the election and divided the
members into four categories.

One hundred fifty three members

Shaftesbury classified as old and worthy and 149 as new and honest.
By this reckoning, the opposition could count on 302 supporters in
the House.

Shaftesbury estimated the court to have only 158 supporters

in Commons, of which he labelled 98 old and vile and 60 new and
bad. 58 His estimations of the opposition's strength in the spring
of 1679 proved to be overblown, for he judged members on their
antipathy towards Danby rather than on their support for exclusion.
In this first round of the contest over exclusion, many men Shaftesbury
counted on as supporters would abstain from voting on the Exclusion
Bill.

Despite the reluctance of some members to vote for exclusion,

the opposition held a commanding majority in the newly elected
House of Commons.
58 Election analysis in Browning, Reresby, pp. 169-170; Haley,
First Earl, p. 500; Jones, First Whigs, pp. 36-48; J.R. Jones, ed.,
The Restored Monarchy, 1660-1668 (London: MacMillan Press, 197~),
pp. 56-57; and E. Lipson, "Elections to the Exclusion Parliaments,
1679-1681, 11 English Historical Review, Vol. 28 (1913), pp. 59-85.

44
Charles took steps to conciliate the opposition and to forestall
the anticipated attack on Danby and James.

Charles asked Secretary

of State Williamson for his resignation, an action by which Charles
hoped to gain two advantages.

Since his detention in the Tower

during the previous session of Parliament, Williamson had been so
overawed by fear of the Commons that he had lost rruch of his
effectiveness.

The king needed a secretary of state on whom he

could rely to carry out his orders.

If a man could be found for

the post who also stood in the good graces of most members of the
opposition, the king's hand would be considerably strengthened.
Such a man was Robert Spencer, the Earl of Sunderland.

Although

he privately supported the policies of Danby, Sunderland counted
several leading members of the opposition among his friends.

He

was a nephew of Shaftesbury and the brother-in-law of Lord Halifax,
who was still considered a member of the opposition. 59
Three days before the new Parliament met, Charles sent James
to Brussels.

Danby persuaded the king that James's presence in

England would further inflame the members against him.

He argued

that if Charles and Parliament could not come to an agreement,
members could not then blame James for the lack of accord. 60 James
left the country with great reluctance.

On the day of his departure

59 J.P. Kenyon, Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (London, New
York, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958), p. 23.
60 surnet, History, p. 197.
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James wrote to the Duke of Onnonde:
. . . you may easily believe, that I take even less pleasure
in going out of England than I did in making so in~jgnif
icant a figure, as I have done for some time past.
The Duke deepy regretted his inability to persuade Charles to take
stern measures against Shaftesbury and his confederates.

Never one

to sacrifice principle on the altar of expedience, James urged
Charles to dissolve the new Parliament, secure the Tower, and
arrest Shaftesbury and his allies.

Reluctant to provoke a civil

war, Charles instead chose to send James out of the fray.

As a

concession to his indignant brother, Charles publicly stated that
he had never been married to anyone other than Queen Catherine.

By

this Charles hoped to reassure James that he was not being abandoned
in favor of the Duke of Monmouth, the king's bastard son, whose
pretensions towards the Crown had long grieved James. 62

I
I
l

I
I

I

Charles opened Parliament on a conciliatory note, listing all
of the actions he had taken to win their favor.

He reminded them

of all he had done to protect England from the dangers of Catholicism,
claiming

credit for consenting to a new Test Act and for the

execution of several participants in the Popish Plot.

He declared

that James had been sent abroad in order to assure that the king
received no Popish counsels. 63 The king's speech failed to win the
61 Lady Burghclere, The Life of James, First Duke.of Ormonde,
1610-1688, 2 vols. (London:---John Murray, 1912)~1~. II, p. 286.
62 Edward Maunde Thompson, ed., Corres ondence of the Family of
Hatton, 2 vols. (Camden Society, 1878, Vol. I, p. 177.
63 sryant, Letters, pp. 305-307.
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House of Commons to the king's cause.

Members assured each other

that Charles had pursued the Plot with great reluctance, and that
all of his actions against Catholics had been grudgingly undertaken.
The king himself soon dispelled the favorable image he was
trying to create.

Acting on Danby's advice, Charles asserted his

prerogative right to reject the Speaker selected by the House of
Commons, Sir Edward Seymour.

This infuriated the House, who

condemned the move as an unprecedented breach of Parliamentary
privilege.

Not wishing to goad Commons into greater hostility,

Charles attempted to settle the matter gracefully by calling for a
brief prorogation, after which the House was allowed to select its
Speaker.
Shaftesbury's allies in Commons took full advantage of the
ill will this incident generated towards Danby and the king.

They

channeled this animosity into a renewed attempt to impeach Danby.
This move against Danby allowed the opposition to play up their
proposition that English liberties, as well as religion, were
imperiled by the Catholic conspirators' plan to establish an
arbitrary government.

By calling attention to the dangers of

absolutism, the attack on Danby could be turned into a design to
limit the royal prerogative.
On March 18 and 19 Shaftesbury argued in the House of Lords
that the impeachment proceedings against Danby were unaffected by
the dissolution of the Cavalier Parliament.

The Lords voted that

within the next week Danby must provide a written response to the
charges levelled against him .

•
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Charles's attempt to put the question of Danby's culpability
behind them ironically broadened the conflict to include the
pardoning power.

He stunned the members by announcing that, since

the incriminating letters had been written by his order, he intended
to

p~rdon

Danby.

Parliament should proceed with public business

and abandon all plans to impeach Danby.

The use of his pardon to

prevent impeachment would nullify Commons' right to impeach a
minister.

The House of Commons quickly rose to the challenge and

attacked the validity of the king's pardon.
Sir Francis Winnington echoed the sentiments of most members
when he declared:

I
I
I

I
I

The King cannot pardon treasons against the government, for
then the government cannot be safe against evil ministers .
. . . If ministers are to be pardoned for the wrongs they
do, there is no security, agg our pretended free and legal
government is a mere cheat.
The two Houses of Parliament disagreed over how to proceed.
The Lords resolved not to condemn Danby's pardon until his lawyers
had the opportunity to defend it.

The members of Commons were

equally detennined to deny the validity of the pardon and to bring
Danby to trial.

The House of Lords voted a bill of banishment

against Danby, which the House of Commons rejected as entirely too

I

lenient.

I

and for several weeks the two Houses were deadlocked.

Commons sought to vote a bill of attainder against Danby,
Finally, on

l

April 14, the Lords voted for an amended bill of attainder, which
was much less harsh than the Commons' bill.
64 Roberts, Growth, p. 220.
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On April 16 Danby surrendered himself into custody and was
committed to the Tower.

Following the king's instructions, he

pleaded his pardon when taken before the bar of impeachment on
April 25.

The House of Commons responded by denying the validity

of the pardon and demanding that the earl be put on trial.
In their eagerness to bring Danby to justice, the House of
Commons encroached upon privileges which by right belonged to the
House of Lords.

Commons demanded that arrangements for Danby's

trial be made by a Committee of Both Houses, rather than by the

I

Lords alone.

The House of Commons next attempted to blackmail the

Lords into abandoning the bishops right to vote on the validity of

I

Danby's pardon.

I

the bishops would vote as the king directed, and so declared that

I

they would not attend the trial of the five Catholic peers until

The members of the House of Comnons realized that

~

I

i

the bishops were denied the right to vote for the pardon.

Goaded

beyond endurance by this assault on their privileges, the House of
Lords voted 65 to 36 to stand by the right of the bishops to vote
on the question of Danby's pardon. 65 When Charles prorogued
Parliament on May 27, the two Houses were again deadlocked over
the question of what to do with Danby.

The unfortunate earl spent

the next five years in the Tower.
The attack waged against the Earl of Danby in the spring of
1679 represented an assault on the monarchy as well as upon an
unpopular minister.
65Ibid.' p. 221.

During their defense of their right of impeachment,
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the House of Commons directly challenged the king's prerogative to
issue pardons, a power Burnet described as:
. . . a main article of the King's prerogative: none had
ever yet been annulled: the law had made this one of the
trusts of the government, without any limitation upon it.66
Of even greater importance than the attack on the royal prerogative
to issue pardons, was the justification the House of Commons used
as the basis of their onslaught on Danby.

The Commons censured

Danby, not for committing an illegal act, but for committing an
unpopular one.
The House of Commons had long since adopted the principle that
ministers of state should refuse to obey any unlawful commands
given them by the monarch.

Operating under the legal maxim that

the king can do no wrong, Parliament forced the Crown's ministers

to bear responsibility for any illegal acts that the king ordered
them to commit.

The impeactment of the Earl of Danby witnessed the

birth of a new constitutional principle--the tenet that ministers
of the Crown must bear responsibility for unpopular as well as
illegal acts.

Danby defended himself during his impeachment by

maintaining that he had violated no law in writing the letters to
Montagu.

This was correct, for the king had every right to bargain

with Louis XIV for a subsidy and to prorogue Parliament at will.
Moreover, it was well known that Danby was no friend to France, and
that he negotiated with Louis XIV out of duty rather than conviction.
66 surnet, Hi story, p. 201.
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These arguments did not sway the House of Commons from its determination to impeach him. 67

The consequences of Commons' resolution to punish ministers
who performed unpopular tasks were far-reaching.

If the king

could not persuade his ministers to perfonn unpopular acts, he
soon found that they often could not be accomplished.
to the law, the king could perform no ministerial act.

According
Fearful of

reprisal from the House of Commons, Lord Chancellor Finch in

"I

March 1679 refused to obey the king's order to put the Great Seal

I

to Danby's pardon.

I

I

I

I

I

I
I

Charles attempted to circumvent this difficulty

by taking the Seal from Finch and ordering a menial servant to
apply it to the pardon. 68 The House of Commons denounced the
pardon as irregularly obtained.

By expanding the scope of ministerial

responsibility during their attack on Danby, the House of Commons
impaired the king's ability to exact obedience from his ministers
and curtailed his capacity to act in opposition to the will of
Parliament.

Sacheverell had this in mind when he declared:

I am not of the opinion that to remove Ministers from the
King will better our condition, unless those maxims of state
they govern by be removed.69
Parliament turned its anger at Danby into an attack on his
associates, another encroachment upon the king's prerogative to
retain ministers at his own discretion.
67 Roberts, Growth, p. 218.
68 I bi d . , p. 225 .
69 sitwell, First Whig, p. 58.

Shaftesbury took the

'\
I
I
51

offensive in the House of Lords by launching another assault on the
Duke of Lauderdale.

In an emotional speech, Shaftesbury asserted

that under Lauderdale's management Scotland was rapidly going
downhill to absolutism.

He assured his audience that in Scotland

slavery was to come first, to be followed by the introduction of
In England, he warned, it was to be the other way around. 70

Popery.

On May 6 Parliament voted another address against Lauderdale.
Parliament made other intrusions into the royal prerogative in

l

I

I

I

I
J

the spring of 1679.

An election refonn bill, introduced on March 26,

directly challenged the king's right to control the calling, prorogation

I

!

and dissolution of Parliament.

I

Parliament taught members the dangers of a longstanding Parliament.

I

I

Danby's management of the Cavalier

I

The bill stated:
no Parliament shall hereafter have Continuance in any
manner, by Prorogation, or Adjournment, or Session • . . for
above the space of two years . . . b~f at the end of two
years shall be ipso facto dissolved.
The king's right to control the timing of Parliamentary sessions
constituted a chief weapon in the royal arsenal.

In denying him

the power to retain a complaisant Parliament, the House of Commons
sought to disarm him.

The bill received a second reading on

April 5.
Commons expressed its hostility towards the monarchy in other
ways.

In order to deny ministers bribe money, the House demanded

7°Fraser, Royal Charles, p. 372.
71 Jones, First Whigs, p. 54.

l

I
52
that all grants of supp.ly be strictly appropriated.

They sought

to take precautions which would prevent another anny from ever
being raised without their consent.

They went so far as to suggest
that the royal guards be replaced by detachments of the militia. 72

The House of Commons was determined that neither the king nor his
ministers would possess the ability to establish an absolute
government.

Inevitably members turned their eyes to the heir to

the throne, the man Shaftesbury labelled "the chief agent of
I

i
I

I

j

arbitrary government in England."
Charles took steps to forestall the expected attack on his

I

I

brother's right to succeed him.

I

members of the opposition, he offered them positions in the restruc-

I

I

I
I

i

I

tured Privy Council.

In an effort to win over leading

He hoped to sow dissension between the

leaders and the rank and file members of the opposition, who would
worry that in accepting office from the king, their leaders had
gone over to the enemy.
On April 21 Charles announced the creation of a new Privy
Council.

The new Council contained thirty members; of these,

fifteen were officers of the Crown and fifteen were men who held
no office under the king.

Of the fifteen councillors who were not
officers of the Crown, ten were to be nobles and five commoners. 73
The king publicly declared that he would govern, "by the constant
72 Ibid., p. 53.
73 Edward Raymond Turner, "The Privy Counci 1 of 1679, 11 English
Historical Review, Vol. 30 {April 1915), p. 252.
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advice of such a council . . . together with the frequent use of
his great council of Parliament. 1174 Privately, Charles confided
to his friend the Earl of Ailesbury, "God's fish, they have put a
set of men about me, but they shall know nothing. 1175
The king had good reason to be alarmed by Parliament's intentions.
The debate in the House of Commons on April 27 witnessed a critical
development in the campaign against a Catholic heir.

On that day

their condemnation of Catholicism was transfonned into an onslaught
J

I

on James.

For the first time, he was openly attacked in Parliament.

I
I

I

The debate began with members considering how best to preserve the
king from Catholic conspiracies.

In order to dissuade Catholics

from killing the king in hopes of seeing James restore Catholicism
in England, Colonel Birch moved, "That a Bill may be brought in,
that at the fall of the King by any violent stroke (which God
forbid!) no person come to the Crown of England till that be
examined. 1176 Although the House did not yet move to exclude James
from the succession, the members clearly expressed their fears
that the Catholicism of the heir was a source of danger.

The

74 Homer E. Woodbridge, Sir William Temple, The Man and His
Work (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1940;
reprint ed., New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1966), p. 194.

75 Ashley, Charles Jl, p. 249.
76 Grey, Debates, Vol. VII, p. 145.
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debate ended with the passing of the following motion:
That the Duke of York being a Papist, and the hopes of his
coming such to the Crown, have given the greatest countenance and encouragement to the present conspiracies and
designs 07 7the Papists against the King, and the Protestant
Religion.
The passing of this motion pointed the way towards exclusion.
Charles made another bid to prevent the House of Commons from
passing a bill to disable James from succeeding to the throne.

On

April 30 Charles appeared before the House of Lords to repeat his
I
l

I
I

'
'
I
I

I

I

I

I

readiness to secure English liberties and religion by paring the
nails of a Catholic successor.

He warned the Lords, however, that

this concession must not be construed to mean that he would acquiesce
to any scheme "to alter the Descent of the Crown in the right line,
nor to defeat the Succession." 78 Lord Chancellor Finch presented
the Lords with a detailed description of the limitations that
Charles had offered to impose by statute on any Catholic successor.
A Catholic king would be denied any ecclesiastical patronage.

Posts in the Privy Council, the Chancery and the Courts of Common
Law were to be filled with the consent of Parliament.

Parliament

would also have the right to nominate the Lords-Lieutenants, their
deputies and the officers of the navy.

In order to assure that a

Catholic successor would not attempt to rule without Parliament,
the Parliament sitting at the king's death would remain sitting for
77Ibid., pp. 150-151.
78

Jones, First Whigs, p. 64.
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a certain time, or, if no Parliament were sitting, the last Parliament
would automatically reassemble. 79 The House of Commons initially
greeted these proposals with great enthusiasm, but much of the
enthusiasm waned as men considered the meaning of the proffered
1i mi tat i on s .
The king's scheme to sow division within the opposition by
appointing some of its leaders to the new Privy Council appeared
to bear fruit.
l
I

I

I

i

The impeachment of the Earl of Clarendon in 1667

had taught members of Parliament a valuable lesson--that politicians
often attacked the Crown's ministers in an effort to supplant them

I

I
I
I

in the government administration.

They feared that their leaders

had abandoned their principles by accepting office from the king.
Members expressed this displeasure on May 1 with the introduction
of a bill requiring that a writ for a new election be issued
whenever a member of Parliament accepted an office or a place or
profit from the king. 80
The opposition soon healed this breach within its ranks.

By

repudiating the limitations scheme, the leaders of the opposition
proved that they were not the king's creatures.

Commons set

May 11 as the day to debate the king's offer of limitations.

In

the course of this debate, the opposition moved explicitly for
exclusion.
....

The debate opened with Bennet proposing that the House

address the king not to allow James to return to England without
79 ranner, Conflicts, pp. 243-244.
80 Jones, First Whigs, p. 63.
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the consent of Parliament.

Other members of the opposition dismissed

this as an inadequate protection against James.

Sir Thomas Player

put into words the idea that had been gaining support throughout
the session when he moved, "That he may be excluded from the Crown
of England, and all Papists whatsoever (as I am sure they may be)
by Law. 1181
Court leaders gained a false sense of security from the fact

r
i
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that more speeches were made in opposition to exclusion than in
support of the proposal.

They hoped to press their advantage by

I

I

I

I

forcing a division, requesting that those who supported the motion

I

I

j

!

I
I

I

for exclusion go out of the chamber to be counted.

Much to their

horror, a great many members leapt to their feet and hastened out
of the chamber.

Realizing that a vote would not be to their
advantage, the court members refused to be counted. 82 This hastily
contrived challenge to the proponents of exclusion backfired and
heartened those who hoped to

elim~nate

James from the succession.

Shaftesbury and his allies were quite correct in their determination to reject the king's offer of limitations, for it is
inconceivable that Charles ever seriously considered implementing

'1
j

such a widespread abrogation of royal authority.

Shaftesbury had

seen firsthand the resistance Charles II had offered to Parliamentary
attempts to encroach upon the royal prerogative in the 1670s.
81 Grey, Debates, Vol. VII, p. 240.

82 Jones, First Whigs, p. 66.
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king who had chided members of Parliament each time that they
tried to exercise undue influence over foreign policy, the retention
of ministers and the duration of Parliamentary sessions, would
never accept legislation that would appreciably curtail the power
and the prestige of the monarchy.
Charles had once expressed his distaste for the sort of
restrictions upon the authority of the king which acceptance of
limitations would bring.

He told the Earl of Essex that

J

I

. . . he did not wish to be like a Grand Signior, with some
mutes about him and bags of bowstrings to strangle men as he
had a mind to it; but he did not think he was a King as long
as a company of fellows were looking into all his acgjons,
and examining his ministers as well as his accounts.

I

I

I

I
I

I
I

I

Shaftesbury held Charles II in little respect, believing that
his brother, his ministers and his mistresses too often influenced
his decisions.

The king's indolent appearance deceived Shaftesbury.

He believed that the real danger to English liberties came from
James, who often goaded his tractable brother into resisting Parliament-

I,

ary attempts to win a greater voice in the governing of English

\

\

affairs.

\

\\

\

Thus, Shaftesbury described James's intentions:

His interest and designs are to introduce a Military and
Arbitrary Government in his brother's time; which can only
secure a man oa his Religion a quiet possession of his
Beloved Crown. 4

\

\.
\

"

Shaftesbury did not realize that his greatest adversary was
the king, who possessed the cunning and determination necessary to
83 Tanner, Conflicts, p. 233.
84 Jones, First Whigs, p. 69.
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defeat exclusion.

\t
j

!

Shaftesbury hoped to channel the fury caused by

the "discoveries" of the Popish Plot into an overpowering national

.demand for the exclusion of Catholic James from the succession.
Convinced that the easy-going king must give way in the face of
such an overwhelming demand, Shaftesbury refused to consider any
other option.

He underestimated Charles !I's resolution and the

weapons at the king's disposal.

In the meantime, Charles declined

all temptations to forcibly suppress the opposition, an action

I

1

which would have provoked a civil war.

Instead he took pains to

appear conciliatory and he offered concessions, albeit in bad

;/

faith.

i '

Shaftesbury saw several reasons for declining the king's
offer of limitations.

Despite his protestations that he would be

willing to legally limit the powers of a Catholic successor, the
king would find it easy to obstruct the passage of such legislation.
Enacting a series of statutes restricting the powers of a Catholic
king would require much arduous legislation.

Once a bill passed

the House of Commons it must go to the Lords for approval.

Here

the court majority could either reject it or amend it beyond
recognition, as happened to the Test Bill in the previous session.
If by some chance a distasteful bill appeared bound for approval
in Lords, the king could kill the offending bill by means of a
prorogation.
Even if the statutes of limitations passed both Houses and
received the king's approval, it was doubtful if they would be
legally binding on the Catholic successor.

James might shrug off
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all such restrictions by utilizing his suspending or dispen~ing
powers. 85 This point arose when the House of Commons debated the
"
I-

i

king's proposed limitations.

j:

limitations, "I should be glad to be shown any bonds and fetters,

II

Sir Nicholas Carew argued against the

I

that a Prince, when he comes to the Crown, shall not easily break. 1186

l

With greater eloquence Richard Hampden contended:

l

I
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I
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For us to go about to tie a Popish Successor with Laws for
preservation of the Protestant Religion, is bindiH~ Samson
with withes; he will break them when he is awake.
·
Sacheverell asserted that the limitations would be valueless
unless they came into operation during Charles !I's lifetime.

This

confirmed Charles in his conviction that his opponents sought far

I

more than the simple removal of James from the line of succession.

I
I

The king believed that if exclusion became law, Parliament would

I

I

arrogate all royal prerogatives under the pretense of maintaining
exclusion. 88
For many reasons, then, an Exclusion Bill would suit Shaftesbury's
purposes far more than would legislation limiting the powers of a
Catholic king.
legislation.

Exclusion could be accomplished by one piece of
If Commons passed the bill when anti-Catholic hysteria

was at its greatest, the king would not dare to either obstruct its
passage in Lords or to refuse to assent to it.
85 Jones, Country and Court, p. 208.
86 Grey, Debates, Vol. VII, p. 238.
87 Ibid., p. 243.
88 Si twe 11 , Fi rs t Whi g , p. 67•
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Exclusion Bill would offer as many opportunities for limiting the
royal prerogative as would the more straightforward statutes of
limitations.

Exclusion challenged the very foundations of royal

authority by implying that the king derived his title to the
throne, and therefore his authority and his powers, from Parliament.
If this were the case, Parliament possessed the authority to
abridge and define the royal prerogative as it saw fit.
In an attempt to justify their effort to dictate the succession,

I
I'

'

members of Parliament scoured the history books searching for
precedents for Parliamentary interference with the succession.

r
I

They often indiscriminately applied these precedents to the problem
of James's succession.

As a result, members airily assured each

other that they were acting in accord with established custom.
actuality they twisted history to their own purposes.

In

They exaggerated

the importance of Parliament in determining the title to the
Crown.

During a debate in the House of Commons on April 27, 1679,

Sir Richard Cust described Henry VII's accession with these words:
11

But his greatest strength to the Crown was not by his match with

the Lady Elizabeth, but by declaration of his title by Parliament. 1189
Sir Richard considerably amplified the role Parliament played in
the first Tudor monarch's accession to the throne.
king by right of conquest.

Henry VII was

By granting Henry a Parliamentary

title to the throne, the cowed Parliament did nothing more than
confirm a fait accompli.
89

Grey, Debates, Vol. VII, p. 142.
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Members of the opposition turned most frequently to the Tudor
period in their search for precedents.

In examining the reigns of

Henry VIII and Elizabeth, members of the opposition discovered
several instances where Parliament regulated the succession to the
throne.

Their joy at unearthing such precedents blinded them to

the fact that this Parliamentary adjustment of the succession took
place under strong monarchs, who directed complaisant Parliaments
to regulate the succession to the monarch's advantage.
I

I•

: !

During the reign of Henry VIII, Parliament thrice enacted

l

legislation altering the succession, each time under the close
supervision of the king.

In 1534 Parliament declared the king's

marriage to Katherine of Aragon void and entailed the Crown on the
issue of his marriage to Anne Boleyn.

Following the fall from

favor of Anne Boleyn, Parliament passed an act in 1536 declaring
void both of Henry's first two marriages and entailing the Crown
on the issue of his third marriage to Jane Seymour.

Mary and

Elizabeth, respectively the daughters of his first two unions,
were declared illegitimate.

In default of issue from his third

marriage, Parliament gave Henry the power to name his successor.
A third Succession Act in 1544 placed Mary and Elizabeth back in
the line of succession after the lawful issue of the king and
Prince Edward.

If the king's three children failed to have children,
the throne would go to the descendants of his sister Mary. 90
90 Taswell-Langmead, Constitutional, pp. 560-562.
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The statute enacted early in Elizabeth's reign which declared
it high treason to deny Parliament's right to regulate the_ succession
held special interest for Shaftesbury and his allies. 91 Sacheverell
made frequent reference to this act during debates on exclusion. 92
Once again, the opposition enhanced the role of Parliament in the
passage of this legislation.

The Elizabethan Parliament had

enacted this statute under the supervision of a monarch who sought
to use Parliament to strengthen her hand against rival claimants
.f-

,.....,-.-.

~

to the throne.

I

I
I

I
i

I

I
I
Ii

!
I

I

·The opposition carefully made no mention of James I's accession
to the throne, for the first Stuart king came to the throne in
direct violation of Parliamentary statute.

According to the

Succession Act of 1536, Henry VIII could devise the Crown on any
person he wished.

In accordance with this Act, the Crown had been

devised on the descendants of the king's youngest sister.
was a descendant of Henry's elder sister Margaret.

James I

We see here

the triumph of hereditary descent over Parliamentary statute,
hardly an occurrence to which the opposition would direct attention.
Supporters of the court also made use of precendents in their
struggle against exclusion.

They pointed to Elizabeth's resistance
to all of Parliament's efforts to force her to name her successor. 93

Despite the detennination with which both sides pursued their
91 Ibid., p. 593.
92 see Footnote 39.
93 Lipson, "Elections", p. 78.

1

!

I

63

search, the presentation of the most persuasive historical precedent
did not decide the Exclusion Crisis.
Three days after a bill disabling James from succeeding to

I

the throne was proposed, Charles sent a message to the House of

l

Commons.

\
I

condition and urged them to vote supplies to build up the fleet.

I

The House dismissed the king's request as a transparent attempt to

I

\

He warned the members that the navy was in a deplorable

I

divert them from their attack on James.

I
I
I
I
i

money would be

~iven

Members voted that no

to the king until the succession was changed,

religion secured and all officers whom they disliked removed from
the kingdom. 94
Although there might have been an element of calculation in

I

the timing of the king's request, Charles had a genuine need for

\

money.

1

of state and the household.

The Crown was delinquent in paying the salaries of officers
No money could be found to disband

the army, while the magazines stood empty and the garrisons were

\

I

in disrepair.

I

Commons had no desire to ameliorate the situation.

Reresby described members' attitudes towards the king's predicament

I

I .,

with these words:

I

I

I:

• . . the Parlament or the major part in a ferment, glad of
thes publique devisions that they might the better clip the
prerogative, lessen monarchy, and carry on their private
designs.95
The Exclusion Bill received its first reading on May 15.
bill stipulated that the Crown should descend as if James were
94 srowning, Reresby, p. 180.
95 Ibid., p. 181.
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dead.

He was to be banished forever from England and if he ever

returned he would be immediately arrested.

Any pe_rson who insisted

on upholding James's right to succeed would be judged guilty of
high treason. 96
On May 21 the bill passed on its second reading by a vote of
207 to 128.

One hundred seventy members abstained from voting.

The leaders of the opposition realized that the Exclusion Bill
would not meet with a favorable reception from the House of Lords,
so they put off the third reading while they attempted to consolidate
their position.
j

l
~

I
I
I

I
I

Ill will still existed between the two Houses

over the question of the bishops' right to vote in capital cases.
Shaftesbury and his allies

so~ght

to rekindle fury over Danby's

negotiations with Louis XIV, his political patronage, and the
dangers of the Popish Plot. 97 They then hoped to channel this
anger into support for the Exclusion Bill.
Secretary of State Sunderland, Lord Treasurer Essex, and
Privy Councillor Halifax hoped to persuade the influential Shaftesbury

I

to come to tenns with the king.

I

to join the small and influential cabinet council, but discovered

I
l

They approached him with an offer

that he sought no compromise with the king.

Angry at, finding him

so intractable, the three ministers urged Charles to prevent
passage of the bill by proroguing Parliament. 98
96 sitwell, First Whig, p. 68.
97 Jones, First Whigs, p. 73.
98 Russell, Life of Russell, p. 161.
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This advice concurred with the king's inclinations.

On

May 27, before the third reading of the Exclusion Sill, Charles

appeared before the two Houses and prorogued his first Exclusion
Parliament.

This body of men would not sit again, for on July 12

the king dissolved Parliament.
On the day of the prorogation the king gave his assent to
what contemporaries considered a minor piece of legislation, the
i

I
j

I
I

I
l
I
I

I
l
I

Habeas Corpus Act.

The act required that there be no delays in

granting a writ of Habeas Corpus, which required a jailer to
produce reasons for an accused person's detention.

The act ignored

the question of which courts had the right to issue a writ of
Habeas Corpus.

The act also did not challenge the king's prerogative

to imprison men by means of a royal warrant.

Charles apparently

looked upon the act with some favor, hoping that it would afford
some protection to Danby and the five Catholic peers imprisoned in
the Tower. 99
The Habeas Corpus Act may not have been intended as an attack
on the royal prerogative, but other actions of the first Exclusion

I

Parliament reveal the opposition's determination to curtail the

I

monarch's powers.

~

Theimpeachment of the Earl of Danby for obeying

I

the king's lawful corrmands gave evidence of a new theory of ministerial

I

responsibility, one which boded ill for the ability of the king to

~

exact obedience from his ministers.

The proposal that no Parliament

99 Fraser, Royal Charles, pp. 379-380.
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be allowed to exist for longer than two years directly challenged
the fundamental prerogative right of the king to detennine the
duration of Parliamentary sessions.

It is, or course, the proposal

of the first Exclusion Bill which revealed the opposition's hostility
not only to Catholicism, but to the unrestrained exercise of the
royal prerogative.

The bill would undermine the foundations of

monarchy, and allow for a much-needed reassessment of the roles of
king and Parliament in the governing of England.

!

l

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

CHAPTER V
THE LINES HARDEN
Seventeen months elapsed between the prorogation of the first
Exclusibn Parliament and the opening session of the second.

I

NeitherlShaftesbury nor Charles remained idle during these months,

l

for both realized that the opening of another Parliament would see

I

a renewal of the contest over exclusion.

I
I
l

Following the prorogation of Parliament on May 27, the task
nistering the government fell into the hands of three men,
the so-called Triumvirate:

Lord Halifax, Lord Treasurer Essex and

l
l

Secretary of State Sunderland.

I

since the earl had sworn to have the heads of the men who advised

I

the prorogation.

I
I
I
(

I

I
I

They shared a deep concern over

Shaftesbury's increasing ascendancy over the opposition, especially

A potentially dangerous rebellion in Scotland faced the king
during May and June.

Provoked by Lauderdale's maladministration

and Archbishop Sharp's attempt to convert the Presbyterians to the
Church of England, the Covenanters rose in rebellion.

They seized

and murdered the archbishop and defeated a government force sent
to subdue them.

Fortunately for the king, the rebels fell to

bickering among themselves.

Immobilized by internal dissent, the

rebels posed much less of a threat.

They met with defeat on
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June 22 at Bothwell Brig, at the ha·nds of a large English force
under the command of the Duke of Monmouth.
This victory over the Scottish rebels catapulted Monmouth
into the English political arena.

The Protestant duke was now the

darling of the masses, acclaimed as a hero by the lower classes of
London.

The popular enthusiasm for the king's illegitimate son

threw the members of the Triumvirate into a panic.

They feared

that Shaftesbury would unite his political goals with Monmouth's
J

I
j

I
I
I
I
I
I

I

ambition and present the duke as the exclusionists' candidate for
the position of heir. 100 Accordingly, they pressed the king to
dissolve Parliament before the triumphant Monmouth returned to
London.
These fears proved to be ungrounded, for, although Shaftesbury
flirted with the idea of putting forward Monmouth, he never committed
himself to supporting the duke's ambitions.

Monmouth may have

been the favorite of the common people, but most influential men
found that the prospect of placing the king's illegitimate son on
the throne left a bad taste in their mouths.

He drew his supporters

from two very diverse groups, the lower class and the court.

In

addition to his friends, Monmouth counted as his supporters a
circle of debauched young courtiers who hoped to attach themselves
to a rising figure in the political sphere. 101
lOOKenyon, Sunderland, p. 27.
lOlJones, First Whigs, pp. 14, 81, 82.
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The prospect of the Duke of Monmouth succeeding to the throne
horrified the king's ministers.

They began to

loo~

with favor on

the more likely alternate candidate for the Crown, William of
Orange, the Protestant husband of James's eldest daughter Mary.
Sir William Temple, the fonner ambassador to The Hague, and currently
a leading councillor, stood high in the favor of the Prince of
Orange.

I

l

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

On June 1, Charles had appointed another councillor,

Henry Sidney, to be the new envoy to the United Provinces.

Charles

told Sidney that he had been selected because William regarded him
with such goodwill. 102
The members of the Triumvirate also preferred William to
Monmouth.

They hoped that by making an alliance with the Dutch,

the king could discharge the accusations that he secretly sympathized
with the policies and governing principles of Louis XIV.

Even if

exclusion failed, William would very likely one day sit on the
throne of England as King Consort to James's heiress Mary.

They

hoped that their pro-Dutch policy would keep them in William's
good books.
Shaftesbury never committed himself to Monmouth's pretensions,

I
I

of Orange.

I

succession, yet he did not champion either of the likely alternatives

but neither did he attempt to link his fortunes to that of William
Shaftesbury had resolved to exclude James from the

102 Henry Sidney, Diary of the Times of Charles II, edited by
R.W. Blencowe (London: Henry Colburn, 1843), p. 1~.
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to James.

Putting the bastard Monmouth forward as substitute heir

would alienate many people who might otherwise have supported

exclusion. Giving his blessing to the candidacy of William and
Mary also involved many dangers.

Mary might refuse to usurp her

father's place in the line of succession.

Even if she expressed

willingness to step into her father's shoes, the exclusionists did
not relish the idea of England coming under the sway of Dutch
William, for they did not like the man.

i

l
I

William was, after all, a

Stuart {the nephew of Charles and James).

He possessed the same

high concept of kingship which so plagued Parliament throughout
the seventeenth century.

Although he was a Protestant, his adherence
to Presbyterianism would not find favor with England's Anglicans. 103

l
l

Moreover, William's preoccupation with his struggle against Louis XIV

I

meant that he would always give precedence to the requirements of

1

I
I
I

his anti-French campaign on the continent.

Exclusionists feared

that William would sacrifice English political liberties in order
to facilitate his campaign against France. 104
The fact that Shaftesbury fought tooth and nail for exclusion,

I

even though he saw no attractive alternative to James, indicates

I

Shaftesbury's conviction that James posed the greatest possible

l

I
I

threat to English liberties.

Furthennore, if William and Mary

came to the throne on the basis of an Exclusion Bill, the nature
103 stephen B. Baxter, William III and the Defense of European
Liberty, 1650-1702 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966),
pp. 165-166.
104 Haley, First Earl, p. 465.
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of their title to the Crown would vitiate many of William's
authoritarian tendencies.

If William held the throne by Parliamentary

title, he could not claim that Parliament lacked the authority to
limit his prerogatives.

Shaftesbury clearly believed that an

Exclusion Bill would pennanently alter the nature of the English
monarchy, leaving the king forever dependent upon Parliament.

For

this reason, the aging and sickly Shaftesbury devoted all of his

I

dwindling energies to securing the exclusion of James from the

I

succession.

l

The members of the Triumvirate believed that Shaftesbury

l

I

I
I
I
I

I

I
I
I

I

I

I

intended to exploit ivionmouth's popularity in order to pressure
Charles into accepting exclusion.

The king heeded their warning

and resolved to dissolve Parliament.

At a meeting of the Privy

Council on July 3 he asked the councillors for their opinions on
the question of a dissolution.
to dissolve Parliament..

The majority advised the king not

Three days later Charles confided to

Lord Chancellor Finch that he intended to dissolve Parliament
against the Council's advice.

Instead of offering to support the

king's decision, Finch warned Shaftesbury of Charles's intention. 105
Shaftesbury roundly denounced the members of the Triumvirate for
advising the king to put an end to the Parliament, but he lacked
the ability to prevent Charles from exercising his prerogative
105 Kenyon, Sunderland, p. 28.
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right to tenninate the session.

When the Council next met on

July 10, Charles tersely infonned the group of his intentions and

warned them that he would not listen to their objections. Two
days later Parliament was dissolved; Charles called for a newly
elected assembly to meet on October 7.
This experience provided Shaftesbury with another opportunity
to assess the value of the king's promises.
I

I
j

I
l

j

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I

When Charles created

the new Privy Council in April he had sworn that he would govern
by the constant advice of the Council. 106 Since then he had
relied for advice on a select group of councillors, allowing the
Privy Council to play no important role in the ordering of the
nation's affairs.

Charles made the decision to dissolve Parliament

in contradiction of the advice offered by the majority of the
councillors.

Despite his fulsome promises to rule in cooperation

with the influential men of the realm, the king chose to rely upon
a small group of favored advisers and to settle disputes by exercising
his prerogatives.

Shaftesbury would remember this when the king

next offered limitations as a substitute for exclusion.
In order to put himself in a position where he need not rely
upon grants of supply from a recalcitrant Parliament, Charles in
the summer of 1679 reopened negotiations for a subsidy with Louis XIV~01
These negotiations would continue, off and on, until the spring of
106 see Footnote 75.
107 Grose, "Louis XIV," p. 200.
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1681 when the two monarchs finally struck a bargain.

In the

meantime, Charles instructed the Lord Treasurer to effect whatever

economies were necessary for the amelioration of the king's financial
situation.
Charles had learned a lesson during the Parliamentary elections
of the past February.

He realized that the prorogation and dissolution

j

of the last Parliament before the Exclusion Bill had received its

I

third reading

I

he must influence the electors in order to prevent his opponents

j

had infuriated the exclusionists.

from sweeping the polls.

He decided that

To achieve this end, he turned to his

l

Lords Lieutenants, men of considera~le importance in the countryside,
and to the loyal clergy. 108 A flood of pro-exclusion pamphlets

I

and newspapers counteracted the clergy's exhortations against

I

exclusion. 109 Concern about James ran so high that Shaftesbury's

I

party won an impressive majority in the House of Commons.

I

believed that the king's resolution to stand by his brother would

I

crumble in the face of such overwhelming opposition.

I

I

Charles.

I

undone together. 11110

I
I
I

I

Shaftesbury

He underestimated

As Sidney recorded in his diary on August 3, the king

"saith he will not leave the Duke, and that they will be both

l0 8Jones, First Whigs, p. 93.
109 Ibid. , p. 95.
llOsidney, Diary, p. 93.

l
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During the course of the elections, an event occurred which
reaffirmed Shaftesbury in his determination to see James excluded
from the succession.

Without warning, the king fell gravely ill

and appeared to be near death.
fell into a panic.
untouched.

Shaftesbury and his associates

James's status as heir presumptive was legally

If Charles died before an Exclusion bill passed into

law, James would take a great deal of pleasure in wreaking vengeance
on the men who had attempted to prevent his succession. The
effort to exclude James thus contained an element of self-preservation.
The king's chief ministers had encouraged Charles to keep
James in Brussels.

His presence would provide unnecessary provocation

j

I
I

I
I
I
I

I

to the opposition during the elections.

As the king hovered near

death, the members of the Triumvirate speculated that Shaftesbury
and Monmouth would attempt to seize control of the government if
the king died.

On August 25 the ministers sent a message to

James, urging him to return to England.

James hastened to his

brother's side, but by the time he arrived Charles had taken a
turn for the better, and the ministers found themselves faced with

~

the embarrassing problem of persuading the heir to leave the
country.
James was not amenable to such persuasion.

He blamed the

ministers for prolonging his exile and held them accountable for
the limitations scheme Charles had proposed during the last session.
James's return broke the Triumvirate.

Halifax and Essex urged

Charles to order James back to the continent, while Sunderland
made his peace with James and urged Charles to send Monmouth,

l

I
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rather than James, into exile. 111

In the end, Charles ordered

both Monmouth and James to leave the country, although James
received the promise that, if Parliament had not met by January,
he would be allowed to return.
the Netherlands.

On September 24 Monmouth left for

Charles moved James's place of exile from Brussels

to Edinburgh, where he would act as Royal Commissioner.
Realizing that the elections were going in his favor, Shaftesbury
had exploited James's return to England in order to strengthen his
hand for the session of Parliament scheduled for October.

l
l

I
I
I

I
I

I

I

!

I

I

I

He

sought to re-create panic over the dangers of James's Catholicism.
His close associate, Sir Thomas Player, denounced James's presence
in London as a danger to the citizens.
watch be doubled. 112

He insisted that the

Player also manipulated London's mayor into declaring against
James, as Charles Hatton recorded in a letter dated September 13,
1679:
It is said Sr Th. Player termed te Duke an enemy to [ye]
city, and one who by ye Parliament had been declared soe to
ye whole nation, and tooke notice to ye Ld Mayor that it had
been reported yt he shou'd have said, had his Maty dyed of
his late illnesse, he wou'd immediately have proclaimed ye
D[uke] of Y[ork] King; wch ye Ld Mayor denyed, Y!§laring he
wou'd stand and fall by ye protestant interest.
On October 7 Charles prorogued Parliament until January 1680,
dashing Shaftesbury's hopes for the coming session.
111 Baxter, William III, p. 166.
112Jones, First Whigs, p. 107.
113 rhompson, Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 195.
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series of prorogations, the Parliament elected in the summer of
1679 did not sit until October of 1680.

According to Burnet, the

king decided to put off Parliament until the nation's temper grew
cooler. 114 In his diary on November 15, Sidney recorded a message
Charles sent to William: "I am to tell the Prince that the King
will prorogue the Parliament, that there was no remedy, that they
would have his crown. 11115 Charles, of course, could not give this
as the reason for his decision.

I

I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

I
I
I
i
I

He let out that he was negotiating

a treaty with the Dutch and that he did not want to meet Parliament
until he could present its members with an Anglo-Dutch treaty. 116
This decision not to call Parliament troubled Essex, Halifax
and Temple.

As a gesture of protest, Essex resigned from· the

office of Lord Treasurer and retired to the country.

Sunderland

grew higher in the king's favor, while Halifax and Temple found
their advice increasingly ignored.

They soon followed Essex's

lead and withdrew to their country estates.
Shaftesbury did not accept the prorogation of Parliament with
good grace.

Charles hoped to postpone the conflict until the

agitation for James's exclusion had.subsided.

He believed that

without a Parliamentary platform Shaftesbury could not keep tempers
at a fever pitch.

The Earl circumvented the king's plans by

launching a nationwide drive for petitions asking Charles to allow
ll4Burnet, History, p. 240.
115 sidney, Diary, p. 187.
116 rhompson, Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 197.
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Parliament to assembie.

Outside of Whitehall Chapel, on December 7,

Shaftesbury handed Charles a petition, signed by seventeen peers,

calling for the immediate summoning of Parliament. 117 Infuriated
at this invasion of his prerogative, Charles infonned his Council
that not only would he not comply with the petition, he intended
to prorogue Parliament until November of 1680.
The members of the opposition organized a nationwide campaign
for drafting petitions and collecting signatures.
I

Shaftesbury

I

hoped to generate excitement and support for exclusion by allowing

!

the common man to play a role in the pro-exclusion movement.

I
I

I

planned to show the king the strength of the opposition by presenting
Charles with "monster petitions," each bearing the names of tens
of thousands of citizens.

Shaftesbury persuaded the influential

I

Common Council of London to present a petition.

I
I

wind of their intention, and frustrated Shaftesbury's plan by

I

I

I
I

He

Charles caught

removing several pro-exclusion councillors who were not qualified
under the Corporation Act. 118
The king sought to thwart Shaftesbury's scheme for maintaining
the unity and sense of purpose of the opposition.

Charles launched

a two-pronged assault on the exclusionists, attempting to discredit
his opposition and to assure the nation that his government was
soundly pro-Protestant.

The king hoped to make clear his displeasure

11 7Kenyon, Sunderland, p. 33.
l1 8Jones, First Whigs, pp. 119-120.
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with the opposition's leadership by dismissing Shaftesbury from
his post as Lord President of thhe Privy Council. 119 He sought to
impress his subjects with the realization that the king considered
petitions calling for an immediate session of Parliament to be
offensive.

Accordingly, on December 12 he instructed Lord Chief

Justice North to issue a proclamation against "tumultuous and
seditious" petitions. 12 Charles, however, did everything in his

°

power to encourage his supporters to present addresses decrying
the opposition's impertinent reliance upon petitions, and abhorring
the petitions as an encroachment upon the royal prerogative.
The winter of 1679-1680 witnessed the polarization of the
politically active into two factions, the "petitioners" and the
"abhorrers. 11

Each side sought to discredit the other, and the

famous epithets each party subsequently adopted as its name developed
from this hostility.

The petitioners were condemned as being no

better than rebels, and their opponents scathingly labelled them
Whigs, the name of a group of Scottish rebels.

The newly-christened

Whigs considered their rivals to be as reprehensible as a group of
Irish brigands known as the Tories.

They ascribed that name to
those who abhorred the petitioning campaign. 121
As part of his campaign to weaken the opposition, Charles set
out to remove all Whigs from positions of authority.
l1 9Fraser, Royal Charles, p. 386.

I
l

I

l20sitwell, First Whig, p. 74.
121 Jones, Restored Monarchy, pp. 58-70.

He hoped to
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cripple his opponents by destroying their bas.es of operation,
hence he ordered the loyal Lords Lieutenants to prepare lists of
Whig office-holders.

During the first half of 1680, Charles

purged Whigs from offices in the localities, from the militia, the
magistracy and the lieutenancy.
proved less successful, however.

His attempt to purge the boroughs
The Whigs had often gained a

controlling interest in the boroughs and they ignored royal orders
to put the Corporation Act into effect. 122
The king's decision to allow James to return to London in
February provoked Whig members of the Privy Council to resign.
Charles did not regret their departure.

When they asked his

permission to withdraw from the Council the King readily assented,
granting their request, "with all my heart. 11123 Charles calculated
that his attempt to remove Whigs from offices of importance would
lead his subjects to speculate that their easy-going king had
asserted himself because he perceived that the Whigs threatened
royal authority.

If his subjects saw exclusion as a mere mask,

intended to conceal an attempt to usurp royal authority, he hoped
that their loyalty to the Crown would reaasert itself with a
repudiation of exclusion.
Charles also hoped to win support by ridding his government
of its reputation for being pro-Catholic.

In spite of his personal

inclinations towards toleration, he allowed his ministers to
122 Jones, First Whigs, p. 121.
123 Russell, Life of Russell, pp. 202-203.
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enforce penal laws against recusants.

On the international scene,

he sought to win his subjects' approbation by creating a series of

anti-French alliances.
His first important step in building a string of Protestant
alliances was to prevent the imolementation of a Franco-Dutch
alliance.

Louis XIV overcame his distaste for the Dutch, and

asked them for an alliance, in order to facilitate his campaign
against Spain and the Holy Roman Empire.

Charles offered William

extravagant promises of English aid, ships, and troops, if Louis
again turn~d against the Dutch. 124 By this means Charles persuaded
William to prevent Dutch ratification of a treaty of alliance with
France.

This opened the way for the creation of an anti-French

coalition.
In the spring of 1680 English envoys set out for the capitals
of almost every Protestant state in Europe.

Envoys were also sent

to Louis XIV's Catholic enemies, Spain and the Empire.

Sunderland,

the mastennind behind the scheme, initiated the plan with high
hopes for success.

As the months passed, his optimism suffered a

severe blow, for however great their antipathy towards France,
most European powers were not willing to risk an alliance with
Charles II.

The continental monarchs realized how strained was

Charles's relationship with his Parliament.

The English king

would be of no value as an ally unless he could provide money and
troops for his allies' defense.
124 Kenyon, Sunderland, p. 41.
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Parliamentary grant of suppply.

Parliament was not in session,

and even if it were, it obviously would be so preoccupied by the
exclusion contest that no grants of supply would be forthcoming. 125
In the end, only the hopelessly weak Spain agreed to sign a defensive
treaty with England.

The failure of his foreign policy, combined

with Shaftesbury's success in holding together his party, persuaded
Sunderland that Charles could not resist exclusion.
Shaftesbury refused to become disheartened by the long prorogation.
In order to rekindle anti-Catholic hysteria, he invented an Irish
plot, complete with plans to take over the government in Dublin
and to massacre Ireland's Protestants.

Shaftesbury relied upon a

tried and true method of arousing English ire.

Englishmen's

longstanding cultural aversion towards the Irish had, in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, united with religious bigotry
to fonn a potent abhorrence of Irish Catholicism.

Shaftesbury

recruited witnesses who would substantiate his claim that the
Irish were about to rise.

In April of 1680 he warned the Common

Council of London that an uprising was imminent, but that he must
reserve the details of it for Parliament. 126
Two events in May of 1680 persuaded Shaftesbury that he must
do everything in his power to expedite the opening of Parliament.
Another sudden illness of the king brought home the fact that
125 saxter, William III, p. 126.
126 Jones, First Whigs, p. 124.
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James's right to succeed his brother was still legally untouched.
Shaftesbury had no desire to remind himself of what would happen

if Charles died before Parliament

resol~ed

the problem.

The king had also stepped up his offensive against the Whigs.
With the blessing of the king, the judges infonned the Privy
Council that, in their unanimous opinion, the king was entitled to
ban unlicensed books and pamphlets. 127 As a result, Whig journalists
and pamphleteers found themselves facing charges of seditious
libel.
Finally, the signing on June 10 of an Anglo-Spanish defensive
treaty (an act which falsely raised fears that other nations might
follow suit) goaded Shaftesbury into a very daring act.

On June 26

he and several of his followers appeared before the Middlesex
grand jury to indict James as a recusant and the king's chief
mistress, the Duchess of Portsmouth, as a common prostitute. 128
Charles intervened, ordering Lord Chief Justice Scroggs to discharge
the jury before it received Shaftesbury's evidence.
This open assault upon the king's brother and mistress electrified
Europe.

The fact that such an audacious act went unpunished

confirmed most continental monarchs in their suspicion that Charles
was no match for his Parliamentary opposition.

The act considerably

heartened the Whigs, who assured each other that Shaftesbury
wouldn't have dared such an insult to the king unless he was
127 Fraser, Royal Charles, p. 389.
128 Kenyon, Sunderland, p. 49.
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confident of victory.

Appalled at the realization that she would

have been placed in the stocks had Scroggs not intervened, the
Duchess of Portsmouth defected to the Whigs.

If the Whig leadership

would guarantee her immunity from future attacks, she promised to
use her influence with the king to persuade him to accept exclusion. 129
All in all, the gamble paid off well for Shaftesbury.

It created

the impression of strength.
The Duke of Monmouth shared Shaftesbury's optimism.

He had

apparently convinced himself that he would be his father's heir.
After being sent to the Netherlands in September of 1679, Monmouth
had slipped back into England without permission late in November.
As a result, Charles stripped Monmouth of his offices and pensions.
The ecstatic reception offered Monmouth by London's citizens
counterbalanced the cold welcome he received from his father.

To

Charles's displeasure, Monmouth lingered on in London, his spirits
buoyed up by the prospect that he might replace his uncle in the
line of succession.

His friends engaged in a wild search for a

mysterious black box, which supposedly contained papers indicating
that Charles had married Monmouth's mother. 130 In order to quell
the rumors to this effect that were circulating throughout the
country, Charles on June 2 declared again that he had been married
only to the queen. 131 Monmouth's hopes refused to be dashed,
129 Ashley, Charles .!l, p. 260.
130 Russell, Life of Russell, p. 203.
- - -

13lKenyon, Sunderland, P·· 49.
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however, for in August he made an almost regal tour of the west
country.
A widely-read pamphlet, published in 1679, offered encouragement
to Monmouth's pretensions.

Its author stated:

He who hath the worst title, ever makes the best King, as
being constrained by a gracious government to supply what he
wants in title, [so] instead of "God an~ ~y Right," his
motto may be, "God and my people" . . . 3
The author clearly recognized the constitutional significance of a
Parliamentary title to the throne:

such a king must acknowledge

that his position and powers were derived from the people and not
from God.
In mtd-August Charles had decided to allow Parliament to meet
on October 21.

A foreign crisis, the Moorish assault on English-

held Tangier, required that a Parliamentary vote of supply be
quickly obtained.

The king realized that the opening of Parliament

would bring a renewal of the attempt to exclude James from the
succession, but he was determined not to abandon his brother.

In

the preceding month, Portsmouth had attempted to fulfill her bargain
with the Whigs by acting as an intennediary between the opposition
and the king.

She had been empowered to offer Charles L600,000 and

the right to name his successor if he would agree to James's exclusion.133 Charles declined the offer.
132 J.P. Kenyon, ed.,' The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688, Documents
and Co1T1T1entary (Cambridge:- University Press, 1966), p. 469.
133 H.C. Foxcroft, A Character of the Tri11111er (Cambridge: University Press, 1946), p.-110.
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85

Despite this refusal, the Whigs were optimistic that the king
would buckle under to their demands.

Most ministers and men close

to the king believed that James's exclusion was inevitable:
Sunderland, Sidney, Godolphin, Essex, Temple, and Burnet shared
this view. 134 Two men hoped to placate the Whigs by renewing the
offer of limitations:

Lord Treasurer Hyde (James's brother-in-

law) and Halifax, who had rejoined the government in June, were of
this opinion.
As he did in the spring of 1679, Charles ordered James to
leave England shortly before Parliament met.

As he prepared to

leave for Scotland, James asked his brother to publicly pardon him
for all offenses he might have committed in the past.

Charles

refused, believing that such an action might provoke the House of
Commons into challenging the validity of the royal pardon, as they
had when Charles had pardoned Danby. 135 The king knew that once
Parliament had reassembled, the Whig majority in Commons would
immediately move for exclusion, which Charles recognized as an
implied threat to his prerogative.

By denying James a pardon, the

king hoped to forestall any Parliamentary attempt to directly
encroach upon his prerogative rights.

134 Feiling, History Tory, p. 182.
135 F.C. Turner, James II (London:
p. 182.
~

His effort proved unsuccessful.

Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1950),

CHAPTER VI
THE SECOND AND THIRD EXCLUSION PARLIAMENTS
In the meantime, the Kg and Duke seeme both in good humour,
and, if they will be finn, I beleeve they are safe; and for
my own part, I think they cannot but together. For, if he
shews he can part with his brother, wht may not be presumed
upon after?
Sir Charles Lyttelton, October 12, 1680 136
The Second and Third Exclusion Parliaments produced increasingly
blatant attacks upon the royal prerogative. The king's staunch
opposition to exclusion forced his opponents to attempt to curtail
his ability to oppose the will of the nation.

Once again, members

of the House of Commons challenged his right to issue pardons and
attacked his ministers.

An even more ominous invasion of the

prerogative occurred when the Commons decided to link an Exclusion
Bill to the creation of a Protestant Association, an action which
would wrest wide powers from the hands of the king.
The House of Commons assembled on October 21 in an atmosphere
of confident expectation.

Great things were in the offing.

Without question, this session of Parliament would witnesss the
final struggle between the king and the Whigs over the exclusion
from the succession of James, Duke of York.

The Whigs felt equal

136Thompson, Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 238.
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to the battle.

The night before the session opened, many Whigs

assembled at the Sun Tavern to celebrate their anticipated victory.
They took heart from the fact that James had been sent out of the
country and that the king's leading ministers had openly predicted
that Charles would abandon James.

The rumor circulated that the

prospects of the coming session had so dejected the nation's
Catholics that they planned to blow up Parliament. 137
The king's speech to Parliament, however, contained no hint
of surrender.

He described his alliance with Spain as one of "the

best measures that could be taken for the safety of England."

He

promised his consent to any measures designed to secure the Protestant
religion, adding the important qualification that these measures
must "consist with preserving the succession of the Crown in its
due and legal course of descent." Finally, he asked for a grant
of supply in order to defend Tangier, which stood besieged by the
Moors. 138
The members of the House of Commons paid scant attention to
the king's request for aid for Tangier. They felt that the threat
to a Moroccan city was of far less import than the threat James's
succession posed to English religion and liberties.

Believing

that they possessed a mandate to rectify the succession problem,
they moved irrmediately to revitalize the Parliamentary campaign
137 cecil Price, Cold Caleb: The Scandalous Life of Ford Grey,
First Earl of Tankerville, 1655-1701 (London: Andrew Melrose, 1956),
p. 52.-- -

138 sryant, Letters, p. 314.
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for exclusion.
They first reaffirmed their assertion that a Catholic king

could not respect the religion and rights of his Protestant subjects.
They accomplished this by dredging up stories of James's complicity
in the. Popi sh Plot. 139 From there it was a short step to the
reintroduction of a motion for a bill disabling James from following
his brother on the throne.

On October 25 Shaftesbury's old ally

in the House of Commons, William Russell, introduced a motion for
James's exclusion.

On the following day, Commons resolved "to

proceed effectually to suppress papery, and to prevent a popish
successor. 11140
The members of the House of Commons did not permit their
struggle for exclusion to preclude the discussion of other grievances.
Sacheverell proposed that the House present the king with an
address stating their conviction that petitioning the king was an
undoubted right of his subjects. 141 In their anger over Charles's
response to the Whig petitions, members expelled several prominent
abhorrers from the House 142 and discussed impeaching Justice
North, the author of the proclamation against tumultuous petitioning. 143
139Haley, First Earl, p. 594.
140 Russell, Life of Russell, pp. 209-210.
141 sitwell, First Whig, p. 139.
142 srowning, Reresby, P. 202.
143sitwe11, First Whig, p. 139.
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Continental rulers followed the proceedings of the House with
keen interest.

Louis XIV was so certain that exclusion would

prevail that he ordered his ambassador Barillon to champion the
candidacy of William as the lesser of two evils, believing that
Monmouth could unite the English better than the foreign-born
William could. 144 For his part, William sent a special representative
to England to promote him as an alternative successor should James
be excluded.

Leyden van Leeuwen frequently met with the king and

his leading ministers, often relaying messages between Charles and
William. 145
The Whigs rushed an Exclusion Bill through the House of
Commons in nine days, proposing it on November 2 and giving it a
third reading on November 11.

The Tory members of the House

realized that the Whigs held a numerical superiority and they
tried to forestall passage of the bill by sowing division among
the Whigs.

The Whig ranks contained supporters of both William

and Monmouth, and the Tories hoped to split Whig solidarity by
insisting that the Exclusion Bill name the king's successor. 146
This caused only a temporary setback, however, for both Whig
factions agreed to state that the Crown should descent as if James

were dead. Monmouth's supporters took heart from their belief
that, should the bill succeed, it could later be amended in favor
144 saxter, William III, pp. 170-171.
145 1bid.
146Jones, First Whigs, p. 135.
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of Monmouth.
Despite the Tories' arguments against it, the bill passed
quickly through the necessary stages of preparation.

Secretary of

State Jenkins attempted to argue that the bill threatened Charles
as well as James:
And this Bill removes the next Prince of the Blood from the
Succession. Is there any security that the present Prince 147
may not be in danger of removal, if this Bill should pass?"
The Whigs discounted any suggestion that the bill would create an
elective monarchy, and declared that the bill would merely prevent
the kingdom from falling into the hands of a puppet of the pope.
Mr. Trenchard stated a fundamental Whig principle, one as reprehensible
to Charles II as it had been to his Stuart predecessors, when he
declared, "The King's right to the Crown is by Common and Statute
1aw. 11148 This pri nc i p1e was incompa ti b1e with the king's concept
of the foundation and perquisites of the monarchy.
In the course of preparing the bill, the Whigs once again
challenged the king's right to pardon offenses.

Charles had sought

to prevent this action when he refused to provoke the Whigs by
extending a royal pardon to James before the Duke left for Scotland.
The Whigs added a clause to the Exclusion Bill rendering the King
incapable of pardoning anyone who supported James's claim to the
throne, an act of treason according to the bill. 149 This usurpation
147Grey, Debates, Vol. VII, p. 426.
148 Ibid., p. 458.
149 sitwell, First Whig, p. 139.
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of the prerogative affirmed the king in his belief that under the
pretext of maintaining exclusion, the Whigs would curtail Charles II's
own prerogatives.
In order to prevent this, Charles on November 9 sent a message
to the House of Commons warning the members that he would never
assent to the exclusion of his brother from the succession. 150
The king's message did not deter Commons from passing the bill on
its third reading.

It did clarify the king's wishes to the House

of Lords, whose members had been confused by reports that Charles
wanted both Houses to pass the bill, so that he could claim that
Parliament forced him to assent to exclusion.

The Lords now

realized that the king did not look to them to provide a gracious
excuse for the abandoning of James.

They realized that Charles

implacably opposed exclusion, and the royalist majority in Lords
rallied to the king's cause.
Shaftesbury's optimism about the outcome of the bill proved
to be unfounded.

He had been convinced that Charles would give

way to the Whig onslaught and encourage the House of Lords to pass
the Exclusion Bill.

Shaftesbury attempted to enfuse the Lords

with some of Commons' enthusiasm for exclusion.

He played up the

dangers of Catholicism by recounting details of the fabricated
Irish Plot. 151 Four days elapsed between the passage of the bill
in Commons and its presentation to the House of Lords.

I

150 Russell, Life of Russell, pp. 221-222.
151 Haley, First Earl, p. 599.
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devoted these days to an effort to coerce Halifax into abandoning
his opposition to the bill.

Halifax refused to be swayed.

Despite threats of impeachment,
152

Shaftesbury and Halifax dominated the House of Lords' debate
on the Exclusion Bill, an exhausting ordeal continuing from eleven
in the morning until late at night.

They both argued ably and

from the heart, but Halifax's eloquence surpassed that of Shaftesbury.
No text of the debate has survived, but those present unanimously
professed their belief that Halifax carried the day for the king.
Burnet declared, 11 ••• he gained great honour in the debate; and
had a visible superiority to Lord Shaftesbury in the opinion of
the whole house. 11153
The House of Lords rejected the Exclusion Bill on its first
reading by a vote of 63 to 30.

In spite of Halifax's contribution,

the credit for the defeat of the bill must go to Charles II.

The

king's presence in the upper chamber had overshadowed the debate
between Shaftesbury and Halifax.

As members voted on the fate of

the bill, they were acutely aware that the king's eyes were upon
them.

A majority of the lords chose not to fail him.
The defeat of the second Exclusion Bill stunned the members

of the House of Commons, who just weeks before had been confident
of victory.

In their anger, they turned upon the man whom they

blamed for sabotaging their attempt to protect English religion
152 Foxcroft, Character, pp. 114-115.
153 surnet, History, p. 252.
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and liberties--the Earl of Halifax.
achieve two goals:

The members now detennined to

the successful renewal of the fight for exclusion,

and the destruction of the Earl of Halifax. Shaftesbury resolved
that the defeat of the bill would not signal the end of the exclusion
movement.

This setback merely indicated that he needed to increase

the pressure on the king, and this he hoped to accomplish by
implementing a policy of systematic obstruction. 154 The House of
Canmons must force the king to realize that, unless he abandoned
James, the House would do everything possible to render the government
incapable of functioning.

Faced by the impossibility of conducting

the government, the king would allow the House of Lords to acquiesce
to Commons' demand for exclusion.
For his part, Halifax turned immediately to reviving a policy
near to his own heart, the placing of limitations upon any Catholic
successor.

On the day after the House of Lords rejected the

Exclusion Bill, the House went into committee to discuss alternative
methods of securing the Protestant religion.
earnestly for a program of limitations.

Halifax lobbied

He proposed that James be

banished from England for either five years or for the lifetime of
Charles II.

He called for an automatic meeting of Parliament

within six months of the succession of a Catholic monarch.

In

order to prevent any Catholic king from establishing arbitrary
government, Halifax recommended that Parliament wrest major powers
154 Jones, Country and Court, p. 212.
I

I
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from his hands.

A Catholic king would be denied the right to veto

bills, the right to fill ecclesiastical positions, and the right
to appoint officers of the ·state or the military. 155
James howled in horror when he heard of Halifax's proposals.
He declared:
To say truth what I hear they are a going on with in the
House of Lords will be as bad consequence, if not worse to
me, and muc~ 5 ~orse to the monarchy, than the bill that was
thrown out.
James correctly stated that the enactment of such limitations would
considerably enfeeble the monarchy.

But he lacked the imagination

necessary to realize that Charles publicly countenanced the limitations
only as a ploy to disann the exclusionists, for Charles was as
devoted to the prerogative as James.
The king's public support for Halifax's policy of limitations
alarmed William of Orange, who hoped to profit from the attack on
James.

William instructed his representative van Leeuwen to remonstrate

with Charles about the dangerous precedent set by agreeing to

I

accept curtailments upon the powers of any king.

This chiding from

his nephew infuriated Charles, who quickly explained to William

I

that he would never be foolish enough to actually surrender power

1.

to Parliament.

Charles reassured William of his devotion to the

155 Foxcroft, Character, pp. 119, 120, 123, 124.
156 Turberville, "House of Lords," p. 416.
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royal prerogative and insisted that the policy of limitations
would never by enacted. 157

William soon exacerbated Charles's displeasure with him.
William persuaded the Dutch States General to present Charles with
a memorial asking him to come to terms with Parliament.
forwarded the memorial to London on November 25.

Sydney

Charles regarded

the memorial as an impertinent effort by William to advance his
own pretensions to the Crown. 158 The king lambasted his envoy
Sidney for encouraging William's impudence and henceforth treated
van Leeuwen with scant courtesy.
The Earl of Essex proposed another alternative to the exclusion
of James from the succession.

He favored the creation of an

Association, similar to the one created during the reign of Queen
Elizabeth.

Its goal would be to secure the acceptance of limitations

by the future king and to protect the life of the present king.
As a means of ensuring that the successor would accept the policy
of limitations once he came to the throne, Essex proposed that
several key towns be placed under the jurisdiction of the Association.159
Charles found the proposal that he surrender his authority

157 Haley, First Earl, p. 605.
158 Kenyon, Sunderland, p. 69.
159 rurberville, "House of Lords, 11 p. 416.
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over many of England's most important cities absolutely reprehensible.
He confided to Burnet that:

He looked on this as a deposing of himself . . . he had a

clear view into the consequences of such things, and looked
on this as worse than the exclusion . . . . The King came to
think that he himself was levelled at chief}6~ though for
decency's sake his brother was only named. 11
After the defeat of the second Exclusion Bill, the Whigs
turned their attention to removing the eloquent and implacable
Halifax from the king's side.

Lady Sunderland expressed the sentiments

of the Whigs when she wrote, "Lord Halifax is the King's favourite,
and hated more than ever the Lord Treasurer was, and has really
deserved it, for he has undone all. 11161 The Whig assault on Halifax
began just two days after the Exclusion Bill went down to defeat.
On November 17 Montagu moved that the House of Commons vote an
address against Halifax, accusing him of advising the dissolution
of the first Exclusion Parliament in July of 1679. The motion
passed 213 to 101. 162 The House presented this address for Halifax's
removal to Charles on November 22.

Charles rejected it, infonning

the House that he considered their reasons for requesting Halifax's
removal insufficient, since Halifax had done nothing contrary to
the law. 163
160 Burnet, History, p. 259.
161 Foxcroft, Character, p. 119.

162 Jones, First Whigs, p. 142.
163 Browning, Reresby, p. 204.
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The Whigs decided to devote the remainder of the session to
paving the way for the reintroduction of exclusion.

Their effort

to persuade the king that the government would be incapable of
functioning until he accepted exclusion constituted a key part of
this program.

To obtain this end, the House of Commons resorted

to blackmail.

On November 17 Charles had reiterated his request

that Commons vote money for the defense of Tangier.

For several

weeks members pondered how best to turn this foreign crisis to
their own advantage.

The king repeated his request for aid for

Tangier on December 15, warning members that their reluctance to
defend an English possession had damaged England's prestige abroad.
Members intent upon obtaining exclusion dismissed the plight of
the city as unimportant.

Colonel Titus declared, "Whoever speaks

now of Tangier ought to do it with some apology.

To talk of the

condition of Tangier now, is like Nero, when Rome was on fire, to
fiddle. 11164
Finally, on December 21, the House of Commons responded to
the king's request for aid for Tangier.

The House presented

Charles with an address on that date declaring that the members
could see no safety for England without the exclusion of James
from the succession and the creation of an Association to guarantee
that the Protestant successor came to the throne. 165 If the king
164 Grey, Debates, Vol. VIII, p. 11.
165 Haley, First Earl, p. 615.

98

accepted these demands, his grateful Commons would vote an ample
supply for the defense of Tangier.
The House of Commons had adamantly refused to accept a Protestant
Association as a substitute for exclusion, but now the House was
determined that an Association be included as an integral part of
any Exclusion Bill.

Charles correctly viewed this demand for an

Association as a declaration of war upon his own prerogatives.
For according to the House of Commons' address, this Association
would oversee the implementation of safeguards designed to secure
a Protestant succession.

Key towns, ports and arsenals would fall

under the jurisdiction of the Association during Charles !I's
lifetime; this to insure that when Charles died the Protestants
would be well-placed to rebuff any Catholic attempt to place James
on the throne.

This proposal allowed Parliament the right to fill

vacancies in the Militia, the Admiralty, and even in the Privy
Council. 166 Supporting James's title to the throne constituted an
act of treason, punishable by removal from office and prosecution. 167
Only men who supported the Protestant succession could serve as
judges, justices of the peace, sheriffs, Lords Lieutenants,
magistrates, army and naval officers, and every other position of
responsibility. 168 The realization of these demands would eradicate
166 sitwell, First Whig, p. 142.
167 Jones, First Whigs, pp. 146-147.
l6 8Haley, First Earl, p. 615.
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every vestige of monarchial authority and leave the king, in the
words of James, a "doge of Venice.n 169 The demands of this address
bore out Charles's fears that the exclusion movement was a doubleedged sword, threatening both implicitly and explicitly to curtail
the royal prerogative.
The loyal ministers of the Crown, already under fierce attack
from the House of Commons, declared that Charles must either give
in to the Whigs' demands or dissolve Parliament in order to be rid
of this House of Commons.

Charles made one last effort to dissuade

members from pursuing their struggle for exclusion.
1681, Charles sent his reply to the Commons' address.

On January 4,
The king

declared that he would never consent to an Exclusion Bill and he
urged them to adopt other measures for protecting the Protestant
religion.

He reminded them that the House of Lords had concurred

with his opinion of the bill, and said that their stubborn insistence
upon enacting exclusion disappointed him.
for aid for Tangier. 170

Once again, he asked

The members of the House declared that they would "put a
brand" upon those ministers who had advised Charles to reject
their addresss.

Commons prepared to begin impeachment proceedings

against the Crown's ministers and several judges. This concerted
attack upon his ministers and judges persuaded Charles that he had
nothing to gain from the continuation of this Parliament.

Accordingly,

169 Haley, First Earl, p. 448, citing a letter from James to William
of Orange, dated May 21, 1678.
170 Haley, First Earl, p. 616.
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Charles prorogued Parliament on January 10 and dissolved it eight
days later, summoning a new one to meet at Oxford on March 21.
This decision to have the new Parliament meet at Oxford,
traditionally a royalist town, alarmed the Whigs.

They feared

that Charles would take advantage of the surroundings to order the
arrest of his opponents.

Monmouth and fourteen other peers petitioned
Charles to permit the Parliament to assemble in London. 171 The
king ignored their petition, preferring for Parliament to assemble
outside of the Whig stronghold of London.
The king demonstrated his unwillingness to surrender when he
dismissed from his Privy Council all the members who had voted for
exclusion, including Shaftesbury, Sunderland, Essex and Temple. 172
This blow fell heaviest on Sunderland, who was ordered to surrender
up his seals of office without being reimbursed the L6000 that he
paid for the right to be Secretary of State. 173
On January 23 Sidney recorded in his diary a conversation
that he had with William of Orange, in which William declared
that, "He believes that the King has taken measures with France,
and so does everybody. 11174 Wi 11 iam correctly assessed Charles I I's
actions.

The uncompromising attitude of the House of Commons

171 Russell, Life of Russell, pp. 256-257.
--172Ibid.
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drove Charles to accept the patronage of Louis XIV rather than the
dictates of his House of Commons.

Beginning in January, Charles

renewed his negotiations with Louis XIV for a subsidy. On March 22,
the day after the Oxford Parliament met, the kings struck a bargain.
In exchange for his promise not to call Parliament, Charles would
receive from France 2,r00,noo livres the first year of the agreement
and 1,500,000 livres in each of the following years. 175 This subsidy
allowed Charles to exist without being financially dependent upon
Parliament, and allowed him to rob the Whigs of their platform for
opposition.
The Parliamentary elections of February 1681 witnessed the creation
of another Whig majority.

As Burnet wrote:

The elections over England for the new Parliament
went generally for the same persons that had served
in the fonner Parliament; and in many places it was
given as an instructio~ 7 Go the members to stick to
the bill of exclusion.
Burnet described a practice which grew out of the 1681 elections-the presentation of instructions to newly-elected Whig members of
the House of Commons.

The leading Whigs drew up a set of instructions

for new members, calling upon them to accept only exclusion and to
reject all other expedients. 177 These instructions also encouraged
the members to pass legislation calling for annual Parliaments.
175 Grose, "Louis XIV," pp. 200-201.
176 surnet, History, pp. 275-276.
177 Jones, Restored Monarchy, pp. 57-58.

102

This usurpation of the royal prerogative of dissolution would
allow the Whig-dominated House of Commons to be recalcitrant
without the danger of being sent packing.
Charles opened Parliament on March 21 with a speech which
firmly stated his opposition to exclusion and to any Parliamentary
encroachments .upon the royal prerogative.

The king assured the

members 'that, "I, who will never use arbitrary government myself,
am resolved not to suffer it in others. 11178 He assured them that:
. . . neither your liberties nor properties can subsist long,
when the just rights and prerogatives of the Crown are
invaded, or the hon~~§ of the government brought low, and
into disreputation.
And he repeated his willingness to accept a policy of limitations
rather than exclusion.

11

I sha 11 be ready to hearken to any such

expedient by which the religion might be preserved, and the monarchy
not destroyed. 11180
Once again, Charles II espoused support for a policy of limitations
which he had no intention of allowing to be implemented.

The king

could safely offer such limitations, for he knew that his Whig
opponents would reject them.

This allowed the king to appear

conciliatory while forcing the Whigs to bear the responsibility for
the failure of the two parties to effect a compromise.
178 Russell, L1fe of Russell, p. 258.
179 Ibid, p. 259.
180 Ibid., p. 261.
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could then place the blame for the inevitable dissolution of
Parliament on the shoulders of the Whigs, who had refused to meet
him halfway.
In accordance with this scheme, Sir Thomas Littleton, acting
on the king's instructions, proposed a new plan to limit the
powers of a Catholic successor.

This plan allowed James to retain

the title of king while William and Mary exercised all the powers
of the monarch, acting as regents for James, who would be in
permanent exile. 181 The Whigs lost no time in pointing out the
weaknesses of such a regency.

Mary might refuse to cooperate, and

even if she did, the regency plan might not be legally binding
upon James.

Winnington called the regency a nonsensical contradiction,

pointing out that once James held the title of king, the loyal
judges would rule that by possessing the title, he had the right
to exercise the powers of the office. 182
Exclusion was the aim and purpose of the Whig House of Commons;
no alternatives would gain their approval.

On March 26, Sir Robert

Clayton moved that an Exclusion Bill be brought in.

After a long

debate, in which the Tory members attempted to forestall the
attack upon James, a resolution for a new Exclusion Bill passed
the House.

The bill received its first reading on March 28,

shortly before Charles appeared and suddenly dissolved Parliament.
181 Haley, First Earl, p. 636.
182 Grey, Debates, Vol. VIII, pp. 325-326.
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By repudiating the king's offer to limit the powers of a
Catholic successor, the Whigs had accomplished what Charles had
intended them to when he called the Oxford Parliament.

Their

intransigence allowed him to blame the Whigs for the failure to
reach a compromise.

The astute Halifax realized this when he

wrote to Burnet:
If you are rightly informed that the expedients were never
intended by one side, I am sure they were unskillfully
refused by the other; for next to gaining the point quitSJ
the best is to put those wee differ with in the wrong."
Popular excitement over the Plot had dwindled to the point
where Charles could dissolve Parliament, without being accused of
doing so to protect the Catholics.

The French subsidy would allow

him to survive without Parliament's financial support.

Charles

relied upon his prerogative power of dissolution to put an end to
the exclusion movement.

Determined never to surrender his prerogatives

or his brother's rights, the king did not call another Parliament.

183 oorothy Lane Poole, "Some Unpublished Letters of George

Savile, Lord Halifax to Gilbert Burnet," English Historical Review,
Vol. 26 (1911), p. 541.
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CHAPTER VI I
CONCLUSION
Charles II dismissed his last Parliament in the spring of
1681 convinced that the victory was his.

As long as he avoided

expensive foreign entanglements, the subsidy from Louis XIV would
allow him to scrape by financially.

He realized that, in resisting

exclusion, he had protected both James's right to the Crown and
the royal prerogative.

The political and constitutional questions

raised during the course of the Exclusion Crisis were ones which
reverberated throughout the seventeenth century.

As a result of

the civil war, the Crown had lost several prerogative powers, but
this loss of power did not pennanently tip the scale in favor of
Parliament.

Charles II's reign inevitably witnessed attempts to

better define the balance of power between the king and Parliament.
By the late 1670s the Restoration settlement was clearly
inadequate.

The king's attempt to rule by relying upon the royal

prerogative in the early 1670s, and Danby's attempt to free the
king from financial dependence upon Parliament in the middle and
late 1670s, raised the spectre of royal absolutism.

The sons and

grandsons of the men who had fought Charles I in the 1640s were
detennined not to surrender the powers and privileges that they
had won in contest with that king.

The outbreak of the Popish

Plot and the ensuing anti-Catholic hysteria offered an opportunity

l
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to settle unresolved questions about the nature of the monarchy
and the extent of the royal prerogative.

The campaign to exclude

the Duke of York from the succession constituted an attempt to
redefine the limits of royal authority, as well as an effort to
protect the Church of England.
Most Englishmen associated Catholicism with absolutism.
Shaftesbury relied upon this sentiment when he worked to channel
the nation's anger over the discoveries of the Popish Plot into
political activity.

James's Catholicism offered a neat issue upon

which to base his campaign to limit the scope and extent of the
royal prerogative.

As this thesis has demonstrated, religion was

not the only issue during the Exclusion Crisis.

On the pretext of

protecting Protestantism, the members of the Exclusion Parliaments
attempted to encroach upon almost every prerogative remaining to
the king.
The Cavalier Parliament, in the autumn of 1678, challenged
the king's control over the armed forces.

This session witnessed

the inception of a new political principle when the House of
Commons began impeachment proceedings against the Earl of Danby.
The principle that Crown ministers bore responsibility for unpopular,
as well as illegal, acts boded ill for the king's ability to exact
obedience from his ministers.
The members of the First Exclusion Parliament continued their
attempt to impeach Danby.

In the course of this effort, the House

of Conmons challenged the king's authority to issue pardons.

This

conflict produced an attempted reappraisal of the Commons' right

107
to impeach ministers and the king's ability to circumvent this by
pardoning his ministers.

Both sides insisted upon their rights;

this important constitutional question remained unsettled.

This

House of Commons also endeavored to usurp the fundamental royal
prerogative of deciding when a Parliament would be dissolved.

The

loss of this power would, of course, considerably limit the king's
ability to resist the will of his Parliament.
In the autumn of 1680, the members of the Second Exclusion
Parliament again denied the king's right to issue pardons. They
attacked his ministers.

This session witnessed an ominous development--

the linking of an Exclusion Bill with a proposal for a Protestant
Association.

In their determinatin to obtain exclusion, the

members of Commons hoped to render the king incapable of opposing
them.

Members sought to arrogate to Parliament the right to

appoint most office-holders.

They demanded that jurisdiction over

several key cities, ports, and arsenals fall into the hands of the
Association.

Those men who denied Parliament's right to alter the

succession in defiance of the king's will, and who insisted upon
supporting James's right to the throne, would be prosecuted as
traitors.
Although it lasted only a week, the Third Exclusion Parliament
in the spring of 1681 showed every sign of continuing the campaign
to limit the prerogative.
presented to the members

The instructions which Whig leaders
of the new House of Commons directed the

members to accept only exclusion and to propose a bill calling for
annual Parliaments.
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The activities of the Exclusion Parliaments verify the contention
of this thesis that political and constitutional issues were
paramount during the Exclusion Crisis.

In the course of the

struggle, Parliament challenged the prerogatives of the king.
Exclusion, itself, would damage the prerogative by creating a
Parliamentary title to the throne.
The men close to the king realized that Charles considered
the exclusion campaign to be directed as much against his prerogatives
as against the expectations of James.

Secretary of State Jenkins

wrote to Sidney explaining the reasons for the dissolution of the
Third Exclusion Parliament:
. . • nothing but the exclusion of the duke would serve their
turn; and t'was plain, nay, which is more, t'was confessed,
an association, the militia, the fleet would have b~s2 demanded
as securities requisite to make good the exclusion.
Reresby reflected much the same sentiment when he wrote in his
memoirs:
Some of the party had blab'd it in the Hous that this was
not only the material bil that they intended should pass this
session to secure the people of England from falling under
popery and absolute government; that it was nescessary that
both the military and civil power should be put into other
hands, and that the present officers of both ought to be
examined and changed; insoemuch as the King was tould that if
he quitted the Duke, it was but to be a step both to quitt
all his friends and servants afterwards, and to fall entirely
into the hands of people that had reason to thinA5 were not
soe wel affected to his person and government."1
184 sidney, Diary, pp. 185-186.
185 srowning, Reresby, pp. 223-224.
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Throughout the crisis Charles II kept a cool head, resisting
the temptation to use strong-arm tactics to disable his opponents.
Charles II possessed an invaluable weapon, the right to dissolve
Parliament at will.

As long as he could exercise this right, he

could cripple any Exclusion Bill.

The king's defeat of the exclusion

movement in the spring of 1681 rested upon his right to exercise
this prerogative.

The Exclusion Crisis left unsettled the question

of the balance of power between the king and Parliament.
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